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No one wholly dominates another in a democracy. This central limiting
principle in democratic political conflict does more than prohibit impris-
onment or murder of political opponents; it also proscribes the total and
permanent defeat of opponents' self-defined ideological or economic inter-
ests. This constraint has varied expressions in American democratic theory
and practice-the assumed permanent existence of some form of opposing
political parties, the ideological tenet that respect for minority rights al-
ways limits majority rule, and the prohibition of slavery.
There is, however, a problem with this supposed democratic constraint:
Some political disputes simply moot it. In some disputes, victory for one
side necessarily amounts to total, annihilating defeat for the other-at
least as the losers construe that defeat. In this circumstance, democratic
principles cannot explain why the loser should accept the legitimacy of his
defeat. Even if the loss followed from a majority vote in a popular elec-
tion, the majority's action would not necessarily attain legitimacy under
democratic theory. This is because equality is a bedrock substantive prin-
ciple of democratic theory and, insofar as the majority is free to disregard
the wishes of members of the losing minority and thereby to treat them as
less than equals, majority rule is intrinsically at odds with the egalitarian
principle.1
At the same time, the egalitarian principle does not justify the victory of a
minority over a majority of voters simply because the minority believes its
vital, non-negotiable interests are defeated. What if the majority believes
with equal intensity that its diametrically opposed, vital interests are at
stake? The democratic principle of equality cannot identify a winner in
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1. Equality is formally satisfied in a majority-rule regime since each voter, before votes are cast,
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this dispute.' But more than this, the equality principle dictates that there
can be no winner in this dispute.
In practical terms, of course, a winner may emerge. But no matter how
much this winner tries to cloak his victory in democratic rhetoric (whether
as a "triumph for majority rule" or a "vindication of minority rights"),
the underlying logic remains that in disputes where one or both of the
parties regards defeat as fundamentally inconsistent with vital interests,
enforcing that defeat is a coercive act necessarily at odds with the demo-
cratic principle of equality.
The Supreme Court has on many occasions attempted to resolve this
logical bind by purporting to give authoritative content to the egalitarian
norm and thereby using it to identify a winner in various disputes. But as
a matter of principle, the Supreme Court's resolutions suffer from the
same deficiency that afflicts authoritative resolutions enacted by
majoritarian institutions. Both depend for their legitimacy on the existence
of an underlying sense of community that unites winner and loser-an
acknowledged common identity that transcends the divisive implications of
the immediate dispute.
The norm of majority rule implicitly relies on the possibility of some
underlying communal identity among winners and losers. Its practical
working assumption is that members of the existing electoral majority are
not locked in exclusive alliance with one another but that some, at least,
are sufficiently prepared to find common ground with the existing minor-
ity in order to hold open the prospect of a redefined communal majority in
which today's loser becomes tomorrow's winner. In constitutional adjudi-
cation, courts similarly rely on an underlying communal identity in their
direct appeals to principles that purportedly reflect shared fundamental
values. But where the opposed parties in fact define themselves as
2. See R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEmocitcy: AuTONOMY VS. CONTROL 90-96
(1982); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMoCRATIc THEORY 90-119 (1956).
3. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (special medical school
admissions program which sets aside places for minority applicants violates equal protection clause);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute applying gender-based distinctions in calcula-
tions of dependency benefits violates egalitarian norm implied by due process clause of Fifth Amend-
ment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("The Equal Protection Clause demands no less
than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all
races.").
4. This reliance has recurrently appeared, for example, in the Court's interpretation of the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as expressing "principlels] of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), or as forbidding "hardship so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), or as embodying "canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples," Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (invoking "solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society"); cf. Wellington, The Nature ofJudicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 494 (1982)
("[Clourts should seek to discover and use the moral ideals of the community as a source of legal
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diametrically and irrevocably opposed to one another, there is no shared
communal interest or value-or at least no apparent communal identity to
which majoritarian institutions or courts can readily appeal in order to
legitimate their resolution of the dispute. These are, in effect, disputes
among aliens in which victory for one appears necessarily as total defeat
for the other.
In this circumstance, what is the proper role for courts in our constitu-
tional scheme? That is the central question addressed in this article. Two
sets of cases will serve as special examples for exploring this question:
cases challenging racial segregation and cases challenging institutional
treatment of retarded people. In both sets, the litigants see themselves as
fundamentally opposed and, more specifically, at odds on the question of
whether there is a binding communal relationship between them or
whether one side is properly free to refuse association with the other.
These cases thus press with particular force against the incapacity of dem-
ocratic theory to resolve disputes between opponents who acknowledge no
mutually binding communal relation, who regard one another as aliens.
I.
In the years immediately following its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,5 the Supreme Court imposed communal bonds between blacks
and whites. Thus in 1959, Prince Edward County, Virginia, decided to
close its public schools rather than accept integrated education; in 1964,
the Court ordered the county to reopen these schools., In 1968 the Court
ruled that freedom-of-choice plans in Southern schools were not an ade-
quate means to end segregation; in so holding, the Court required that
school boards assign black and white children to the same schools without
regard to the expressed wishes of either white or black parents for this
mixed attendance.7 Again, the Court acted on the premise that blacks and
whites were inescapably members of the same community, no matter how
fervently members of either race sought to deny this fact. But the Court
never stated its reasoning with this stark clarity, and in 1970, the Court
began for the first time since Brown to operate on a contrary assumption.
In that year, the Court permitted a segregated public park in Macon,
Georgia to close rather than to be opened to both blacks and whites.8 The
principles.").
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 US. 218 (1964).
7. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
8. The park property had been given in trust to Macon in 1911 for the use of "white people
only"; in 1966 Supreme Court held that the park must be treated as a public institution and opened to
both races. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966). The Georgia Supreme Court then ruled that
"the sole purpose for which the trust was created has become impossible of accomplishment and has
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next year, the Court permitted the city of Jackson, Mississippi to close its
public swimming pools for the same reason.' These decisions were the
first ratification of a newly evolving pattern of race relations: that whites
who were unprepared to relate to blacks as equals could choose instead to
have no relations with blacks, to secede from any community in which
they had common membership.
This secessionist impulse has considerable salience in our political tra-
dition. It received resounding endorsement as an apparently inalienable
right in our first national act, our declaration of independence from Great
Britain. The document marking that act has a pointed, if ironic, relevance
here. The opening words of the Declaration have become so familiar that
we have almost stopped hearing them. But listen to them again:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Na-
ture's God entitle them .... 10
Here was the introduction into our political vocabulary of the formula
which came to justify the secession of blacks and whites in the South into
supposedly "separate but equal" stations.11
But this secessionist principle does not stand without contradiction in
our past. The Civil War was fought precisely to decide whether some
members of a community, by seceding and declaring independence, could
free themselves of any obligations to other community members. The
question whether, or the extent to which, the War was fought to free
slaves is much less clear than the proposition that the War was fought to
been terminated." Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 871, 148 S.E.2d 329, 330 (1966). The case was
remanded to the state trial court, which granted the motion of the successor trustees that the property
revert to the residual legatees. The Supreme Court found no constitutional violation in the state
court's enforcement of the reversion. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
9. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
10. The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776).
11. The Louisiana statute under review in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), mandated
"equal but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races," id. at 540. The Court gave the
phrase no special significance but simply ruled that separate accommodations were not inherently
unequal under the Fourteenth Amendment. The phrase was subsequently turned around at the same
time that it was elevated to holding in McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914),
when the Court reinterpreted Plessy to require that separate facilities be equal in fact. See McCabe,
235 U.S. at 160 ("Ilt was not an infraction of the Fourteenth Amendment for a State to require
separate, but equal, accommodations for the two races.") (citing Plessy); see also Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, 79 (1917) ("In Plessy v. Ferguson, classification and accommodation was permitted upon
the basis of equality for both races."); Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and
Race in the Progressive Era (pt. 1), 82 COLIuM. L. Ray. 444, 468-69, 485-94 (1982) (suggesting that
McCabe was first time Court gave weight to equality side of "separate but equal" equation).
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save the Union and to deny that anyone was free to leave simply as an act
of autonomous choice.12
There was, however, an enormous cost that followed from the North's
insistence that the Union must be preserved. The cost was the most de-
structive and bloodiest conflict that this nation has ever fought: More than
600,000 men were killed, a larger absolute number and a larger propor-
tion of the total population lost than in any other war America has
fought.1 The economy of the South was also virtually destroyed and
much of its territory left in smoldering ruins. Though hostile ground
forces had invaded parts of our country before, they have never done so
since, and neither before nor since with such devastation.14 The stunning
extent of this human carnage and economic destruction set the stage for
Plessy v. Ferguson 5 thirty years later. The Supreme Court in Plessy re-
nounced the fundamental principle for which the Civil War was fought:
the principle that people who were joined together in a community could
not walk away from that relationship. The Court instead permitted whites
to secede from communal relations with blacks by establishing "separate
but equal" public facilities.1 '
It is easy today to criticize Plessy. But in order to understand this deci-
sion, and to understand its contemporary relevance, we must do more than
condemn it as if it were an ancient relic. Plessy was a response to a genu-
ine problem. In one sense the problem came from the incapacity of demo-
cratic theory to address diametrical opposition, but the problem was more
than theoretical. The social context of Plessy vividly demonstrates the
practical political problem that necessarily accompanies this theoretical
difficulty: If one member of a community feels such strong hostility to
another that he is prepared to break off communal relations, then it is
difficult to see how future forced relations can lead to anything but violent
12. On the eve of the Civil War, both Lincoln and the Congress were prepared to disclaim any
abolitionist intentions in order to preserve the Union. On March 2, 1861-two days before Lincoln's
inauguration and just a month before the bombardment of Fort Sumter-Congress, by two-thirds
vote, sent a proposed constitutional amendment to the states that irrevocably protected the institution
of slavery. If ratified, it would ironically have been the Thirteenth Amendment. Lincoln explicitly
endorsed this proposed amendment in his Inaugural Address. D. POTTER, LINCOLN AND His PARTY
IN THE SECESSION CRISIS 301, 321 (1942); see also D. DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED 209-15
(1961) (discussing various explanations for Civil War); D. PoTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848-
1861, at 44-50 (1976) (discussing relationship of slavery and survival of Union) [hereinafter cited as
THE IMPENDING CRISIS].
13. If the ratio of dead to population had been the same in World War II as that of Southern
dead to Southern population in the Civil War, we would have lost five million Americans in World
War II, rather than the 384,000 actually killed. T. WILLIAMS, That Strange Sad War, in THE
SELECTED ESSAYS oF T. HARRY WILLIAMS 31, 33 (1983).
14. J. ROARK, MASTERS WITHoUT SLAVES: SOUTHERN PLANTERS IN THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 35-108 (1977); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-
1913, at 107-12 (2d ed. 1971).
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
16. See supra note 11.
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conflict. Thus, the principle of secession appears at its simplest level to be
justified as a way of avoiding violent conflict between those with diametri-
cally opposed interests. This was the perception-the apparent political
problem-that led the Supreme Court to abandon the Civil War amend-
ments in Plessy v. Ferguson.1 7
This problem of apparently irresolvable, potentially violent political
conflict also framed-and was, I believe, an underlying impetus for-the
Supreme Court cases beginning in 1970 that accepted the principle of se-
cession in relations between blacks and whites. These were years of ex-
traordinary convulsions produced by our involvement in the Vietnam
War, closely following the widespread race riots of the 1960's. Though
this secessionist impulse has not yet utterly dominated the Supreme
Court's race cases, it is at work in all of the cases and in different Jus-
tices' opinions with different degrees of intensity and clarity.18
The secession issue is, moreover, not limited to racial segregation cases.
It is also visibly at stake in the Court's recent cases involving institutions
for retarded persons. These cases appear to reflect a wish on the part of
normal people to dissociate themselves from retarded people, and thus
they also mirror the emergence of the so-called "white backlash" since
Brown. But more than this, the Court's majorities in these cases repeat-
edly rely on a constitutional norm of "state autonomy." The invocation of
that norm signifies the rising dominance of a narrowly individualistic, se-
cessionist impulse for all manner of contemporary social relations.1'
17. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 350-56 (dramatic and violent deterio-
ration of race relations accompanied transition from "slavery system" to "caste system" by late 19th
century).
18. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion by Stewart, J.) (in
absence of showing of intentional racial discrimination, at-large electoral system does not violate Con-
stitution); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(system-wide desegregation remedy inappropriate in absence of affirmative acts of racial discrimina-
tion by local school board); id. at 479 (Powell J., dissenting) (where segregated school systems not
product of intentional government action, system-wide desegregation orders inappropriate and
counterproductive); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (Powell, J.) (proof of discriminatory intent necessary to show constitutional violation by local-
ity in denying rezoning application necessary to build racially integrated housing project); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (Burger, C.J.) (absent finding that racially discriminatory acts of
school districts or state "have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation," district court could
not order interdistrict desegregation remedy).
19. In the days of Plessy, this impulse was also spread across the face of the Court's work. This
was most openly expressed in the Court's hostility to labor organizations whose underlying premise
was that workers had a continuing stake in their employment relationship notwithstanding an em-
ployer's wish to end (or unilaterally to dictate the terms of) that relationship. See In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND
BENCH, 1887-1895, at 83-88, 119-22 (1960).
This secessionist vision of economic relations was also, though less obviously, expressed in the Loch-
ner series of cases, where the Court refused to permit a majority in legislative forums to impose terms
on the employment relation. The Court instead demanded deference to the principle that employer
and employee approach one another as isolated individuals who might choose to relate or not, and to
relate on any terms for which they alone might contract. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
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In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,20 the district
judge found that the very existence of a large-scale, geographically isolated
residential institution violated the constitutional rights of its retarded resi-
dents.2 He therefore ordered the institution closed and required the state
to provide alternative community residences with therapeutically home-
like settings.2 The Third Circuit essentially affirmed this order, though it
based its holding on a congressional act rather than directly on constitu-
tional norms.23
During oral argument of the case in the Supreme Court, several Jus-
tices pressed the question whether the state was free simply to close its
institutions and provide no assistance whatsoever to retarded people. 24
This issue was not directly posed in the case itself, since the state sought
only to run its institutions without judicial supervision; nor did the
Court's opinion directly address this issue. But in overturning the Third
Circuit's reading of the congressional statute, Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion set out the general proposition that the Constitution gives great
weight to the principle of state autonomy and that states must accordingly
have great latitude to allocate or to refuse resources as they see fit. Rehn-
quist therefore concluded that congressional impositions must be narrowly
construed in light of this constitutional imperative.25 The Court's praise
for the principle of state autonomy suggested its willingness to uphold the
action of any state that might ultimately refuse to provide any assistance
to retarded people.2
This was made more explicit in Youngberg v. Romeo,2 7 decided the suc-
ceeding term. Romeo involved the same state institution as Pennhurst,
though this suit was not a class action seeking wholesale institutional clo-
sure but was instead an individual action by one resident who claimed
constitutional violations in the institution's failure to protect him from
abuse and to provide him with training programs. The Court ruled that
the state was constitutionally obligated to provide at least "minimally ade-
see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITTIONAL LAw 434-42 (1978) (discussing Lochner progeny).
20. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
21. Id. at 1318.
22. Id. at 1326-28.
23. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 104-07 (3d Cir. 1979) (Devel-
opmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act establishes preference for community rather
than institutional residence for retarded people), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
24. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 75-81, Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
25. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981).
26. The Court invoked a ghost of Lochner by characterizing federal-state relations as "contrac-
tual" so that "[t]he legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract'" 451 U.S. at 17.
27. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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quate training" to an institutionalized retarded person. But the Court
made clear, in an opinion by Justice Powell, that this obligation arose
only because the state had chosen to make this person "wholly dependent
on the State" by placing him in an institution; the Court observed that
"[a]s a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services for those within its border.12 8
Both Romeo and Pennhurst involve more than the question whether
states must share communal tax resources with retarded people. They
raise the issue whether others are inescapably obliged to regard retarded
people as members of their community. The district court order in
Pennhurst requiring community residential placement addressed this issue
quite directly. But even the claim for an institution-based training pro-
gram in Romeo had a similar implication; its premise was that without
training, Nicholas Romeo would persist in violent and bizarre conduct
that frightened others and prompted them to abuse and to isolate him. In
both cases, the retarded people claimed a right to acknowledged inclusion
in a wider community, with the proviso that this inclusion was possible
only if the "normal" members of that community made a special, and
especially expensive, effort to include them.
Retarded people can cast this claim in "autonomy" terms: The refusal
of others to include them inhibits the development of their full individual
capacities and interferes with their freedom to choose association with
normal people." But put in these terms, there is an obvious rejoinder:
Retarded people's wishes to associate are inconsistent with others' wishes
to refuse this association. Thus put, these cases raise the thorniest under-
lying problem of the racial segregation cases at the time Brown was
decided.
The problem appeared in two forms. The first was the question of the
efficacy of any judicial remedy: If either blacks or whites did not want to
associate, how could courts force them into association with any hope of
fruitful results?30 (This same question of efficacy is raised regarding
court-ordered community residences for retarded people. 1) The second
28. Id. at 317.
29. See generally J. GLIEDMAN & W. RoTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORrTY: HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN IN AMERICA 221-37 (1980) (discussing undesirability of separating handicapped school
children from peers).
30. Justice Jackson alluded to this concern in an unpublished memorandum that he may have
intended as the draft of a 6oncurrence in Brown: "[Whether the] real abolition of segregation will be
accelerated or retarded by what many are likely to regard as a ruthless use of federal judicial power is
a question that I cannot and need not answer." Quoted in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 688 (1975).
31. For instances of community resistance to association with retarded people, see New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d
Cir. 1979) (rejecting public health rationale offered by school board for segregating retarded children);
Comment, Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Retarded in Maine: The Inevitable Face-off with Zoning,
35 ME. L. REv. 33 (1983).
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question was one of principle, of freedom of choice. Even assuming that
racial segregation laws interfered with the freedom of blacks to choose
association with whites, what principle could justify forcing unwilling
whites into the company of blacks?
This was the proposition from which Herbert Wechsler, the most
prominent academic critic of Brown, built his case in 1959.12 Wechsler
argued that these diametrically opposed associational wishes meant that
there were no subsuming "neutral principles" available to resolve this
controversy.33 Having construed the dispute in these terms, Wechsler was
correct in seeing it as dilemmatic." But he drew a non sequitur from this
observation. He argued that this dilemma rendered courts specially unfit
to resolve the controversy and required them to defer to majoritarian insti-
tutions. In effect, he argued that this dilemma afflicted courts more than
other institutions because courts are specially obliged to act on principle
while majoritarian institutions are free from this constraint."5
There is a limited validity to this argument: Majoritarian institutions
are free to fashion many principles of action from whole cloth, to make
"policy choices" inappropriate for courts. But this special freedom adheres
to majoritarian institutions only because their actions rest on underlying,
implicit communal bonds between majority and minority. In controversies
such as these involving racial segregation or institutionalization of re-
tarded people where communal bonds are adamantly denied, this source
of legitimation is not available to majoritarian institutions. 6
32. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
33. Id. at 34.
34. A different construction of the system of racial segregation was more plausible in the social
circumstances of the pre-Brown South. Rather than refusing association, whites wanted it but insisted
that blacks remain permanently subordinate in that association. See Black, The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960). But though Wechsler may have misconstrued
Southern whites' intentions and thus erred in his criticism of Brown, his basic theoretical premise
remains correct. This premise, moreover, has more accurate descriptive relevance to contemporary
race relations than to relations in the late 1950's. See infra pp. 478-79.
35. Wechsler, supra note 32, at 19.
36. Some commentators, most notably John Hart Ely, have argued that courts can properly inter-
vene only to police the processes of majoritarian institutions in order to assure that all disputants have
appropriate access. See J. ELY, DEMocRACY AND DISTRuS'T (1980). This process limitation does not,
however, adequately address the problem of principle presented by these disputes. The problem is not
in process; full access to participate in a majority decision would not solve it. The problem is that the
disputing parties have diametrically opposed definitions of the community in which they claim mem-
bership: One party excludes the other from any communal relation while the other demands inclusion.
Courts cannot restrict their attention to the process by which this substantive dispute will be addressed
because both the substantive and procedural aspects of the dispute depend on defining communal
membership. In another sense, the dispute is jurisdictional: Is one who chooses to secede nonetheless
properly subject to the coercive authority of majoritarian institutions? For related criticisms of at-
tempts to restrict judicial review to process concerns, see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1092-95
(1981); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Tenn-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1, 6-11 (1979).
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Wechsler's critique also ignores the historical fact that the Civil War
marked the repudiation of the secessionist principle and that the Civil
War Amendments gave federal courts a central role in enforcing the terms
(and thereby implicitly the fact) of that repudiation. Even before these
events, the Supreme Court had claimed for itself a special role in refuting
the secessionist principle and protecting the indissolubility of the national
community. The Court had assumed, most notably in McCulloch v. Mary-
land37 and Dred Scott v. Sandford," that it could accomplish this role by
definitively resolving disputes that might otherwise lead to disunion.3 '
This pretension was of course exploded in the immediate wake of Dred
Scott, but its underlying imperative survived the war. The imperative sur-
vived because the contradiction in democratic theory could not be eradi-
cated; democratic theory cannot identify a legitimate winner in intense,
diametric disputes.
Though all of our governmental institutions attempt in various ways to
obscure this contradiction-to soften its sharp edges and somehow to lead
warring parties toward a consensual accomodation-a special role has de-
volved on the Court simply because of its alluring availability as a forum
of last resort for persistent dissidents. The Court cannot resolve this con-
tradiction any more than can other institutions. The Court can, however,
dramatize this contradiction more powerfully and even more menacingly
than other institutions. It does this, sometimes self-consciously and some-
times not, in the very format of constitutional litigation.
Here is the recurrent drama. Adversaries fight, and not simply regard-
ing trivial matters, but about the content of the fundamental charter of the
country; they fight and then the Justices announce the true content, which
ends the fight. Or does it? What if the losing party resists? And what if
37. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
39. See Chief Justice Marshall's prologue in McCulloch:
In the case now to be determined,. . . [t]he constitution of our country, in its most interest-
ing and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the government of the Union
and of its members, as marked in that constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion given,
which may essentially influence the great operations of the government. No tribunal can ap-
proach such a question without a deep sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility
involved in its decision. But it must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legisla-
tion, perhaps, of hostility of a still more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this
tribunal alone can the decision be made.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
454-55 (1856) (Wayne, J., concurring) ("'The case involves private rights of value, and constitutional
principles of the highest importance, about which there had become such a difference of opinion, that
the peace and harmony of the country required the settlement of them by judicial decision.").
A similar conception of the judiciary's peace-making role appears implicit in Chief Justice War-
ren's retrospective observation regarding his Court's racial relations work: "[T]he vast majority of
people must realize by now that racial equality under law is basic to our institutions and that we will
not and cannot have peace in our nation until the race issue is properly settled." E. WARREN, THE
MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 293 (1977).
464
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that losing party has greater apparent force than the Court can command?
What if the losers are the majority force in the political institutions, the
majority whose actions the Court has now declared unconstitutional? Will
the majority in the states, in the Congress, through the Presidency, acqui-
esce in the Court's judgment, or will they fight openly; and if the majority
fights, will the Court find powerful allies anywhere?
The salience of these questions in any action by the Supreme
Court-and their special force when the Court invalidates the act of a
majoritarian institution on constitutional grounds-is loud testimony to
the fragility of our institutions: to their fragility in fact, because dissension
can so readily persist among unrepentant losers and can so readily ob-
struct peaceful processes, and to their fragility in principle because dia-
metric conflicts cannot be resolved on the basis of democratic theory. In its
symbolism and in its structure, the Supreme Court through constitutional
litigation vividly shows how easily political conflict becomes transformed
into diametric opposition regarding the fundamental tenets of our society
and how such opposition can lead thus to the brink of civil war-and, in
the typical case, we all back away from that abyss.
In this demonstration, the Court plays a role different from the
majoritarian institutions. It is misleading, however, to characterize this ju-
dicial role as distinctively coercive or nonconsensual but to describe the
majoritarian institutions as grounded on democratic principle. The Court
and its processes are more visibly nonconsensual-speaking more explic-
itly in an authoritarian voice, invoking coercion more openly-than the
processes of the majoritarian institutions. But judicial review is not
thereby, as Alexander Bickel claimed, a "deviant institution in the Ameri-
can democracy"'40 because majoritarian institutions rest on popular con-
sent while the Court does not. The Court instead reveals a quintessential
characteristic of all American political institutions because it, more than
the others, shows the fragility of communal bonds in democratic theory
and practice. The Court, more than other institutions, points to the sub-
stratum of coercive force that necessarily lies beneath relations between
people who might otherwise be divided by deep-rooted antagonisms. The
Court does differ from the other institutions-not in kind but only in the
clarity with which it shows the practical and principled affliction of all
democratic institutions.
Skeptics of judicial authority deduce from this affliction that there is no
role for courts in the face of it. Thus, in a widely cited dictum, Learned
Hand maintained that
40. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLrrcs 18 (1962).
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[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court
can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes no court need
save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting
upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will
perish.41
Judge Hand raises here an issue separate from, and prior to, the ques-
tion of principle regarding the judicial role posed by Professor Wechsler
and elaborated by Professor Bickel. Judge Hand's claim is methodologi-
cal: that there is no way for courts in the face of divisive disputes to
achieve a spirit of moderation or the underlying communal bond that is
the basis for such spirit, and that without such spirit and bond, these
disputes are irresolvable. I believe, however, that the gravitational pull
specially exerted on deeply divisive disputes by courts in our institutional
scheme, coupled with their palpable weakness in imposing effective force
on the disputing parties, gives courts a pedagogic advantage over other
institutions that Hand failed to appreciate. This advantage does not assure
practical success. But once we have grasped the virtues of this methodol-
ogy uniquely available to courts in confronting diametrically opposed dis-
putants, we can approach the questions of principle that follow: whether
courts may properly invoke these methods and, even more fundamentally,
whether and when they are obliged to do so.
We can address the methodological issue by considering in some detail
a pedagogic tradition that, at first glance, may seem unsuited to any court.
The tradition is in the New Testament parables which teach that every-
one may choose to become a member of the same community.4 From this
it follows that no one may unilaterally exclude another from the commu-
nal relation; each is accordingly obliged to treat others with equal regard
(to observe the Golden Rule or the "spirit of moderation," as Judge Hand
would put it).43 Jesus' use of these parables in this pursuit is certainly not
a clear example of practical enforcement success. Nor do I invoke this
precedent as direct proof that courts are morally obliged to make this ef-
fort regardless of its likely success. Rather, these parables represent a ped-
agogic methodology that is also available, and distinctively available, to
41. L. HAND, The Contribution of an IndependentJudiciay to Civilization (1942), reprinted in
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 181 (I. Dilliard ed. 1959).
42. See E. SCHILLEBEECKX, JESUS: AN EXPERIMENT IN CHRISTOLOGY 249-56 (1979).
43. Jesus emphasized the pre-eminence of this obligation:
Then one of the lawyers. . . came forward and asked him, "Which commandment is first
of all?" Jesus answered, "The first is, 'Hear, 0 Israel: the Lord our God is the only Lord;
love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with
all your strength.' The second is this: 'Love your neighbour as yourself.' There is no other
commandment greater than these."
Mark 12:28-32 (New English).
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courts because of their institutional characteristics.
II.
The Constitution is a secular document that purports to derive its au-
thority from popular sovereignty. The initial authoritative act establishing
the binding force of that document has so far receded in our past, how-
ever, that it often seems more like an oracular, even a divine, act than an
ordinary secular event. The special posture of judges, as remote black-
robed protectors of the document, adds to its sanctified aura. There are,
therefore, parallels between the secular authority of the Constitution in
the polity and the divine authority of the Gospels in religious belief, and
between the exegetical role of judges and of priests and prophets.
There is a further, presentational similarity between the Gospels'
teachings and the pages of the United States Reports. In both settings, the
claim for authority often appears apodictic, assumed rather than argued
for, and deference thus seems commanded rather than requested. Yet this
appearance is often contradicted: Reasons for compliance are given and
dependence on voluntarily proffered obedience is admitted. Thus in both
settings there is a conjunction of claimed unquestionable authority and
admitted weakness to command obedience.
In the Gospels, the parable of the prodigal son illustrates the method
Jesus used to refute what I call the secessionist principle and to teach the
lesson of community. The narrative outline of the parable is familiar. A
father divides his wealth between his two sons; the younger son takes his
share away from the family home and squanders it, then returns impover-
ished and feeling disgraced. But the father welcomes him joyously, ar-
ranges a homecoming feast and proclaims to everyone, "[L]et us eat and
make merry; for this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and
is found." 44
But what of the elder son and his attitude? What kind of burden did
the return of this younger prodigal put on him? Why should he welcome
this return? The parable continues:
Now [the] elder son was in the field; and as he came and drew near
to the house, he heard music and dancing. And he called one of the
servants and asked what this meant. And [the servant] said to him,
"Your brother has come, and your father has killed the fatted calf,
because he has received him safe and sound." But [the elder son] was
angry and refused to go in. His father came out and entreated him,
but he answered his father, "Lo, these many years I have served you,
and I never disobeyed your command; yet you never gave me a kid,
44. Luke 15:23-24 (Revised Standard).
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that I might make merry with my friends. But when this son of
yours came, who has devoured your living with harlots, you killed
for him the fatted calf!" And [his father] said to him, "Son, you are
always with me, and all that is mine is yours. It was fitting to make
merry and be glad, for this your brother was dead, and is alive; he
was lost and is found."45
The parable ends here; we are not told whether the elder brother was
persuaded by his father's injunction to join in the rejoicing. But this ques-
tion, it seems to me, is the crucial aspect of the story. Why should the
elder brother rejoice? Is it because the father has ordered him to rejoice,
has invoked his superior authority? And is the further implicit message
that Jesus in telling the parable has invoked his extraordinary authority,
his divine authority, to establish the correctness of the father's command
that we should all rejoice?
But here is a practical difficulty, a paradox. How does anyone order
"rejoicing"? Grudging acquiescence, perhaps, can be ordered, but not joy.
Yet it is joyfulness, merrymaking, that the father enjoins. He cannot ex-
pect the elder son to comply-to feel joy, to "make merry and be
glad"-unless his words have touched a deeper feeling already in the
elder brother's heart. Then the elder son would also find joy in his
younger brother's return-joy that when he was "in the field," at a dis-
tance, he had not recognized in himself.
Perhaps the elder brother did not feel this; perhaps he never would join
in the rejoicing. The parable ends without resolving this doubt. The possi-
bility remains that the elder son would simply reiterate his question,
"Why did you disfavor me? Why have I been wronged?" This dramatic
indeterminacy could have its own impact on the listeners whom Jesus ad-
dressed in telling the parable. If they identified themselves with the faith-
ful elder son, betrayed by his father's attention to the undeserving prodi-
gal, then Jesus' substantive message would be as much lost on them as on
the elder son in the parable itself. The parable, that is, holds open the
possibility for continued dispute between Jesus and his listeners as well as
between the father and his elder son.
This does not seem incidental or unintended. The Gospels make clear
the importance of the parables' open texture. This was suggested quite
self-consciously when the disciples specifically asked Jesus why he spoke
in parables to the crowds gathered to hear him. Jesus replied:
To you the secret of the kingdom of God has been given; but to those
who are outside everything comes by way of parables, so that (as
45. Id. 15:25-32.
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Scripture says) they may look and look, but see nothing; they may
hear and hear, but understand nothing; otherwise they might turn to
God and be forgiven."'
This is a puzzling explanation. Why should the parables intentionally
conceal their meaning? But this is not the least puzzle in this purported
explanation. Jesus also distinguished between "those who are outside," for
whom the parables are apparently designed to mystify, and his disciples,
the quintessential insiders, to whom "the secret of the kingdom of God"
has been given. But having drawn this distinction, Jesus immediately con-
founded it; for he asked his disciples, "You do not understand this para-
ble? How then are you to understand any parable?"4 Jesus then pro-
ceeded to explain, to decode, the parable. But the underlying message was
clear that if the disciples had been true insiders, true recipients of the
divine secrets, then no such elaborate explanation would have been
required.
By this account, the parables are not intended to be readily accessible to
any listener.48 They are designed to raise questions more than to answer
them, to confound rather than to confirm prior understanding, and partic-
ularly to accomplish this in order to raise doubts among their listeners
about whether they are among the elect or remain outside among those
who "hear and hear, but understand nothing."
The parable of the prodigal son itself makes this point. The elder son
had regarded himself as faithful "these many years" to his father's com-
mands and thus more worthy than his erring brother, but the father con-
founded this apparently reasonable expectation. Jesus told the parable in
response to a challenge to his own similar unconventional conduct: "And
the Pharisees and the scribes murmured, saying, 'This man receives sin-
ners and eats with them."' 49 Again, the purpose is to confound insiders
and outsiders, to unsettle those who are confident of their rectitude. But it
was not enough for Jesus simply to say this. He tried to dramatize this
proposition for his listeners; he tried not simply to exhort them from a
distance but to draw them in to experience unexpected self-doubt.
The strategy in all this is not simply to confound or to raise self-doubts
for their own sake; the strategy is to heighten the listeners' sense of their
own vulnerability. This is shown, though with typical. paradoxical indi-
46. Mark 4:11-12 (New English).
47. Id. 4:13.
48. See F. KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY: ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NARRATIVE
23-47 (1979); E. SCHiLLEBEECKX, supra note 42, at 155-58. Regarding an apparently similar "nar-
rative technique of studied reticences. . . [and] significantly patterned ambiguities" in the Old Testa-
ment, see R. ALTER, THE ART OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE 126, 153-59 (1981).
49. Luke 15:2 (Revised Standard).
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rection, in the parable that immediately precedes the story of the prodigal
son, the parable of the shepherd and the lost sheep. Jesus offered this
parable as his initial response to the challenge "murmured" by the self-
righteous scribes and Pharisees:
What man of you, having a hundred sheep, if he has lost one of
them, does not leave the ninety-nine in the wilderness, and go after
the one which is lost, until he finds it? And when he has found it, he
lays it on his shoulders, rejoicing. And when he comes home, he calls
together his friends and his neighbors, saying to them, "Rejoice with
me, for I have found my sheep which was lost." Even so, I tell you,
there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than
over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance.50
This parable repeats the central oddity that the story of the prodigal
son presents: Why should a father, why should heaven, rejoice more for
one repentant sinner than for those who "need no repentance"? And was
it fair or sensible for the shepherd to abandon the ninety-nine sheep "in
the wilderness" in order to seek out the lost one?"1
Here again, the parables confound insider and outsider. The shepherd's
action in abandoning the ninety-nine sheep in effect converts all of them
into lost sheep; all of them become vulnerable and none can count on the
continued presence and strength of the shepherd for protection. And here
is the basic strategy for teaching the lesson of community. Jesus did not
teach this lesson only by speaking on behalf of sinners, of the weak, of
outcasts; he did more than argue their case to the righteous, the strong,
the insiders. He argued that there are none but outsiders. He asserted that
there are no righteous people without need to repent, there are no faithful
elder sons, there are no sheep but those who are lost. And thus the central
oddity of these parables disappears. Who are these "ninety-nine righteous
persons who need no repentance?" There are none. Who, hearing the
parables and choosing to listen, can be confident that he is among this
"ninety-nine"?
From this premise alone, Jesus offered hope: the possibility of finding a
way inside through acknowledgement of vulnerability. He offered this
hope through the father who welcomes his prodigal son (as we are all
prodigals), the shepherd who searches for his lost sheep (as we are all
lost). Even more compellingly, he offered this hope in his own life: the
outcast, scorned and crucified, who is received joyously by his Father in
heaven and is reborn; as with the prodigal son, who "was dead, and is
50. Id. 15:3-7.
51. See Erikson, The Galilean Sayings and the Sense of "I", 70 YALE REV. 321, 353 (1981).
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alive again; .. .was lost, and is found."
This is the message of hope, of reassurance; but how much hope can it
reliably give? What power stands behind it to make good on its promise?
There is no easy answer to these questions in the New Testament Gos-
pels; and it is not the point of the Gospels to give an easy answer. Their
point is to portray the urgency of the questions; no one can take for
granted that he is safely inside some protected flock, that he is found.
Once this possibility is admitted, once an individual believes so deeply in
his own vulnerability, it is of course tempting to believe even more deeply,
more urgently, that salvation is available, that a protecting father with
unquestionable authority and power is at hand. But if provoking this
temptation is the underlying goal of these parables' teachings, they do not
pursue this directly. The parables do not undertake to demonstrate the
truth of this particular answer. The parable of the prodigal son in partic-
ular makes clear that the father's authority is insufficient to obtain the
result he wants from his elder son. All that the father's authority can
command-but this it clearly can command-is a hearing for his point of
view. The father can command his elder son to listen to the lesson but not
to obey it. This is the first step of the methodology of the parable. The
father can command a hearing because he and his elder son stand in a
pre-existing relationship of hierarchical authority. But this is only the first
step. How does the father convert the opportunity provided by his proce-
dural capacity to obtain a hearing into joyful acceptance of his substantive
lesson? The underlying goal-and the basic methodology of all of these
parables-is to lead the listeners to acknowledge a question, not an an-
swer: a question about the true extent of their own safety. The premise of
this methodology is that when the listeners acknowledge their vulnerabil-
ity, they will see the appeal of the answer that Christ represents. The
parables in effect only teach the proper question so that, once taught this,
the true initiates teach themselves the proper answer.
III.
What is the lesson in all of this for judicial conduct in our secular soci-
ety? Again, the first part of the lesson is methodological. Judicial invoca-
tion of the Constitution recurrently uses the same methods as these para-
bles: converting all into needy outsiders by confounding insider and
outsider and then offering hope for ultimate protection by mapping a path
back inside for everyone.
The clearest example of this method in recent times, and perhaps in the
entire history of the Court, is the series of racial segregation decisions
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beginning with Brown v. Board of Education.52 In these cases, until at
least 1970, the Court's use of the methodology of the parables was virtu-
ally explicit and self-conscious. Ultimately I will argue that this methodol-
ogy dominates the work of the Court whether or not the Justices prefer or
acknowledge it. The imperative for this methodology arises from the inter-
nal contradiction in democratic principle that I identified at the outset, in
the incapacity in principle or practice of democratic institutions to resolve
disputes between diametrically opposed parties. The argument will
emerge most clearly if we begin with instances where the Justices did not
resist this imperative but embraced it.
Brown was such an instance. The Court confounded both insider and
outsider by placing its power at the service of outcast blacks, by identify-
ing the Constitution with the cause not simply of ending their enslavement
but of ending their exclusion from equal intercourse with all others. In
the metaphor of the parable, this was the Court as shepherd leaving the
self-satisfied flock to find the lost sheep. The second step I have
sketched-that the flock was thereby converted into needy outsiders-was
only implicit in Brown, but it became resoundingly explicit four years
later in Cooper v. Aaron.53
The Governor of Arkansas, Orville Faubus, ordered state troops to bar
black students from attending Central High School in Little Rock. The
Supreme Court proclaimed that Faubus's action was war against the Con-
stitution;" that his action endangered the "maintenance of our federal sys-
tem of government";55 that Faubus was in effect an unjustified rebel, an
anarchist, an outsider to the American community who threatened its in-
tegrity and who would remain outside, excommunicated, until he re-
pented. At the same time the Court offered a route for return: submission
to its authority. The question of Faubus's willingness to include blacks in
his community was thus transformed-as in the parable of the prodigal
son by the father's injunction to his eldest son-into the question of
Faubus's willingness to submit to a higher authority who had chosen to
embrace a previous outsider, an outcast.
The Court did not, however, explicitly offer Faubus an option to refuse
submission; nor did the parables offer this option in their terms. Indeed,
the Court in Cooper v. Aaron enunciated the most emphatic demand for
unquestioning obedience in its entire jurisprudence:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "su-
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. at 4.
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preme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking
for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the funda-
mental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable
case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that "It is emphat-
ically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is." This decision declared the basic principle that the fed-
eral judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Consti-
tution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of
binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Every'state legislator
and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath
taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to support this Constitution."
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said
that this requirement reflected the framers' "anxiety to preserve it
[the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against
resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State ..
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 524.
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against
the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.
Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that:
"If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judg-
ments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights ac-
quired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a sol-
emn mockery . . . ." United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136. A
Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court order is sim-
ilarly restrained. If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes,
in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, "it is manifest that the fiat of a
state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would
be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal
Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent
phrases . . . ." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-398.51
I cite this passage at such length for several reasons. It poses first of all
a question of audience: For whom is it written? This passage suggests the
same paradoxical answer that Jesus gave his disciples about his parables:
that the Court speaks both to insiders and outsiders and it speaks in order
to mystify both, though in different ways. For outsiders the mystification
is apparent: a parade of historic figures (Marshall, Taney, Hughes), a
flurry of mysterious citations (Art VI; cl. 3; 5 Cranch; 21 How. and the
56. Id. at 18-19.
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like), all with the implication that the Court's majesty, its claim to be
taken seriously, is enhanced thereby.
But for those who already take or want to take this authority seriously,
for those who see themselves as disciples or aspire to that status, this pas-
sage raises a deeper puzzle. Such insiders would know Chief Justice Ta-
ney and Ableman v. Booth: Taney the author of the notorious Dred
Scott5' decision entrenching slave status and Ablenan v. Booth,58 overrid-
ing Northern states' efforts to withhold alleged runaway slaves from their
Southern masters. This invocation of Taney and Ableman says to knowl-
edgeable insiders that fealty to the Constitution means submission to the
Court regardless of one's own judgment concerning the propriety of the
Court's demand. The reference in this passage to Chief Justice Hughes in
1932, just before his Court struck down important New Deal legislation,"
carries the same implication. To question the Court is, by this passage, to
misunderstand its authority under the Constitution, to move outside the
constitutional community.
A similar conclusion is implicated by Jesus' sharp rejoinder to the disci-
ples who questioned him: "You do not understand this parable? How
then are you to understand any parable?" 60 By these equivalent state-
ments of Jesus and of the Court, to be a true disciple of either, a true
insider, requires the transcendence of one's ordinary critical faculties, an
act of faith. How then does one become or remain an insider, according to
these directives? By a mystifying process indeed; even by a self-mystifying
one.
To admit this is to raise a question about the power of Jesus or of the
Court to secure obedience in practice. The admission raises this question
because this kind of command (to believe, to have faith) seems fundamen-
tally not amenable to external enforcement. Jesus in his ministry openly
admitted this proposition. He had no armed force at his command, and he
repeatedly refused to invoke the apparently awesome divine power that
some allege him to have had; indeed, he chastised his disciples for advocat-
ing this invocation.61 Jesus' death-mocked by others and even apparently
plagued, momentarily at least, by his own doubts 2 -made his weakness
extraordinarily vivid.
57. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
58. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
59. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (overturning Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (overturning Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (overturning National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
60. Mark 4:13 (New English).
61. Luke 9:51-56; Matthew 26:51-54, 4:5-10, 16:21-23.
62. Mark 15:34.
Vol. 93: 455, 1984
Teaching of the Parables
Justices of the Supreme Court might not so readily withhold invocation
of whatever awesome power they could muster; the declamatory rhetoric
in Cooper v. Aaron is not the voice of the meek. But whatever they might
prefer, the Justices have little choice in this matter. The Court is, as many
have observed, "the least dangerous branch," without direct power to
command "the sword or the purse." 63 This does not mean that the Jus-
tices are without power. It does mean that, when their power is directly
and adamantly challenged, they cannot protect themselves by their inde-
pendent acts; they are dependent on others' acts of faith, of good faith
toward them.
The immediate context of Cooper v. Aaron itself makes this clear. A
full year before that decision, President Eisenhower had sent federal
troops into Little Rock to countermand Governor Faubus's action.
Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court had ordered this presi-
dential action. As a matter of constitutional doctrine it was agreed then
(and remains virtually as clear in the Court's cases even today) that judges
had no authority over the President for such directives." Nonetheless the
President did not portray his actions as voluntary; when he sent the
troops, he stated that "[o]ur personal opinions about the [Brown] decision
have no bearing on the matter of enforcement."" 5 The President thus
presented himself as a model of the true believer in the Court's power; he
ostentatiously purported to suspend his own critical faculties; he displayed
his faith by submitting to the Court's will notwithstanding his power to
disobey.
For the legal cognoscenti, moreover, the President's power to disobey
was more than a practical reality. As constitutional head of a separate, co-
equal branch, the President could have plausibly claimed authority not to
deploy the troops that the Court needed to enforce its will. Eisenhower
may have seen himself as free in principle to ignore the Court's wishes,
but may have decided for political reasons to hide his own volition in
sending troops behind the screen of obedient submission to the Court.66
But whether he saw himself as true believer or merely calculated that it
was expedient for him to masquerade as one who believed in the Court's
63. Alexander Hamilton originated these phrases in the Federalist papers. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
64. See McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed.': A Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 991, 1076-77 (1956) (President has discretion regarding use of armed forces to enforce court
decrees); cf. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.) (separation of powers dictates that
courts may not direct Attorney General to initiate criminal prosecutions), cert. denied sub norn. Cox v.
Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
65. Radio-television address by President Eisenhower (Sept. 24, 1957), reprinted in B. MusE,
TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE 141 (1964).
66. See E. WARREN, supra note 39, at 289, 291-92 (Warren's acerbic evaluation of Eisenhower's
failure to avow his own agreement with Brown).
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authority, the symbolic point remains the same: Because knowledgeable
observers know that the Court's commands are never self-executing, each
command carries with it an implication of the Court's vulnerability, of its
dependence on others. The Court is more obviously dependent on enlisting
the cooperation of others-of outsiders-than are the other institutions in
our government. Thus, whether the Justices admit it or not, like it or not,
every action of their institution carries the same fundamental implication
confounding insider and outsider, confounding strong and weak, conveyed
by the parables.
The Justices rarely admit to this weakness. But this is why Cooper v.
Aaron is an extraordinary decision in the Court's jurisprudence. The cri-
sis regarding its own authority, and regarding the rule of law in this
country, that the Justices palpably saw in Governor Faubus's defiance
brought their weakness into unaccustomed visibility at the same moment
as-even because-the Justices were making a transcendent claim to com-
mand obedience.
The Justices' weakness appeared in Cooper v. Aaron in the very way
that they spoke, even before they began speaking. The tradition estab-
lished by John Marshall was that the Court asserted its collective force by
uniting behind a single Justice who "delivered the opinion of the
Court."61 7 In Cooper v. Aaron the Court departed from this tradition.
Though there was a majority endorsing a single opinion (indeed, the hold-
ing was unanimous), no one Justice spoke for the Court this time. Cooper
v. Aaron instead began this way: "Opinion of the Court by The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter," and so on, listing
each individual Justice by name."' The Justices may have believed that
this unprecedented way of emphasizing their unity would enhance the ap-
pearance of strength in the Court. Whatever their intent, however, this
manner of speech inevitably personalized the institution, highlighting the
fact that, after all, these were nine men speaking.
The Justices also emphasized their vulnerability, again perhaps unin-
tentionally, at the very end of their opinion in another unprecedented ac-
tion. They unanimously reaffirmed the Court's original decision in
Brown, though none of the litigants had suggested or even anticipated that
the Court might re-examine that decision. The Justices explained their
reasons for this unusual action in this final paragraph in Cooper v.
Aaron:
The basic decision in Brown was unanimously reached by this Court
67. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIAIS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 504 (10th ed. 1980)
("John Marshall persuaded his colleagues to abandon seriatim opinions.").
68. 358 U.S. at 4.
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only after the case had been briefed and twice argued and the issues
had been given the most serious consideration. Since the first Brown
opinion three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one
with the Justices still on the Court who participated in that basic
decision as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously
reaffirmed. The principles announced in that decision and the obedi-
ence of the States to them, according to the command of the Consti-
tution, are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaran-
teed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional
ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth."'
The Court thus united behind the original principle of Brown. But it
could take this stance only by overcoming the potential vulnerability
caused by the absence of three Justices who had participated in Brown.7 0
In the body of their opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, the Justices pro-
claimed, as I recited earlier, that the "federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution" and that from this proposition
"[ilt follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunci-
ated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.171
Whatever the force of this syllogism in principled or practical terms, the
final paragraph in Cooper v. Aaron implicitly admits that the syllogism
does not apply to new Justices on the Court, that they are not bound in
unquestioning obedience toward the Justices who preceded them. They
are not bound unless, of course, they choose to bind themselves as the new
Justices did in the final paragraph of Cooper v. Aaron.
The new Justices' voluntary submissions, acts of faith, thus gave
strength and extended life to the will of the old Justices. This renewal,
and the implicitly acknowledged vulnerability of the Court to the prospect
of new Justices willing to repudiate the old, testified not only to the un-
controllable political forces that always stand behind, waiting to under-
mine, the Court's claim for power to command obedience. This reaffirma-
tion of Brown also spoke in simple personal terms to the Court's
vulnerability because it was composed of men who might fall weary and
resign, of men who might die.
This implication of the Court's unanimous reaffirmation shares an un-
derlying similarity with the substantive message of the parables: the ideal
of community not simply as a morally worthy pursuit but as a haven from
chaos, from personally vulnerable isolation, from the prospect of death
itself. In the parables, the sheep returns to the flock, the prodigal son to
69. Id. at 19-20.
70. Justice Jackson had died and was replaced by Justice Harlan; Justices Minton and Reed had
resigned and were replaced by Justices Brennan and Whittaker.
71. 358 U.S. at 18.
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his family home: Each "was dead, and is alive; . . . was lost and is
found."172 The Justices portrayed their own unanimity and reaffirmation
of common purpose in this same life-giving sense: "[Olur constitutional
ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth."' In the
parables, the communitarian ideal is meant to point beyond the secular
world. The vision in the race cases remains secular. But in both instances,
the communitarian ideal promises safety.
This is the substantive message that arises from the methodology shared
by the parables and race cases. Their method, their pedagogic technique,
is first to command the attention of people who conceive themselves as
safely inside some protective flock; then to persuade these people that they
are no different from others visibly outside, even others whom they believe
they have excluded from their own safe superiority; and, finally, having
provoked in these once-smug insiders feelings of vulnerability and conse-
quent empathic identification with the old outsiders, to show how this
empathy in itself can serve as the route for membership in a community
that promises a more reliable, more secure haven.
IV.
Unlike the New Testament, neither the substantive message of commu-
nity nor the methodology of provoking special sympathy for outcasts is
pervasively characteristic of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Indeed, as I
suggested earlier, the powerful force of secessionism as a respected princi-
ple in our political tradition appears to point the other way. Although
Brown stands against the secessionist principle, we may now be in the
process of abandoning opposition to this principle just as we did in the
generation that followed the Civil War. And for the same reason: because
the costs of communal relations appear-at least to one party-excessive
and frightening, filled with apparently unresolvable conflict and potential
for violence. We may today be drawing distinctions between some blacks
and whites who share common ground, and others who are divided by
residence, by income, by family structure, by prospects for employment,
and who, from this viewpoint, have so little in common that they are not
members of the same community."' This is the meaning of the stunningly
72. Luke 15:32 (Revised Standard).
73. 358 U.S. at 20.
74. In 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, convened by President John-
son in the wake of widespread race riots, observed: "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one
black, one white-separate and unequal." NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT
1 (1968). This ominous movement has continued:
The gap between the average incomes of whites and blacks is as wide today as it was in
1960, primarily because the proportion of black families headed by women rose from one-fifth
to nearly one-half and the proportion of black men with jobs dropped sharply in that period
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and disproportionately high rates of black unemployment, 5 particularly
in urban areas where more and more blacks are congregating. The old
assumption had been that blacks were always needed at least to do the
most menial tasks, the dirty work in the society, but even this assumption
apparently does not hold now. The massive unemployment of blacks re-
flects the tenuousness of this old assumption and its implicit link of inter-
dependence, of a bondage between blacks and whites, a community bond
that once apparently could not be broken.78
Despite this evident impetus toward secessionism, however, a consider-
able conceptual and practical problem prevents it from attaining the status
of a right.77 Even though the cost of maintaining a relationship appears
excessive to one party, and leads him to proclaim his independence of the
other, nonetheless the cost of breaking off that relationship may seem ex-
cessive and therefore wrongful to the putatively abandoned party. The
latter's claim for a continuing relationship can take many forms. It can
rest on a notion of equity that comes from weighing comparative bur-
dens-as from the perspective of retarded people who will be utterly help-
less and destitute, shut away in their own world if the wider community
does not somehow include them. The claim can rest on past interactions
with implications that cannot be cancelled by a unilateral act of will-as
from the perspective of black people who see themselves unfairly shut
away from community resources to which they had earlier made dispro-
portionate, uncompensated contributions. Whatever the components of
these different calculations of cost between the seceder and seceded, how
can these different calculations be sensibly compared?
To put the question in this way is to ask whether there is a single
community in which these disputants remain members: not necessarily a
community in which they embrace one another's company, but a commu-
nity of discourse, of common meanings, in which their conflicting interests
Fourteen percent of white families with children under 18 are headed by women, while
47 percent of black families are in that category, up from 8 percent in 1950 and 21 percent in
1960.
The problem is compounded. . . by the fact that only 55 percent of black men over the age
of 16 are employed today, as against 74 percent in 1960.
Herbers, Income Gap Between Races Wide as in 1960, Study Finds, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1983, at
Al, col. 2, A8, col. 1.
75. The unemployment rate in October 1982 was 9.3% for whites, 20.2% for blacks, and 15.2%
for Hispanics. See Pear, Bias Blamed for High Minority Jobless Rates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1982, at
B6, col. 4. The United States Commission on Civil Rights found that the differences in unemployment
rates increased in the 1970's "as the burdens of the mid-decade recession fell heaviest on minorities
and women." Id.
76. Writing in 1944, Gunnar Myrdal saw the first indications of this increasing trend toward
social and economic distance between the races. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE
NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 380-82, 582-99, 647-62 (1944).
77. For consideration of the uncertain status of a "right to secession" in international law, see L.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DErERMINATION 20-137 (1978).
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and perceptions can be described in comparable terms, thereby identifying
a single calculus of costs and benefits. Unless such a community of dis-
course exists, how can a third party, a judge, stand between these two
conflicting parties and adjudicate their conflict in terms that take adequate
account of both apparently incommensurable perspectives? This question
in effect asks whether the underlying grammar, the deep structure, of a
vocabulary of rights demands some shared understanding, and therefore
some kind of consensuality, among all people to whom that vocabulary
can properly apply.78
Lurking behind this conceptual problem is an urgent practical problem.
Effective withdrawal from communal relations depends in many circum-
stances on the acquiescence of both parties, not simply on the will of one.
This acquiescence need not be voluntary on both sides, but it must be
purchased somehow, and as a practical proposition, coercion by itself is a
flawed instrument for this purpose. Contemporary race relations vividly
make the point. If wealthy whites want to stand on the principle of auton-
omous withdrawal from poor urban blacks in the face of black demands
for resource redistribution, and if whites cannot obtain voluntary submis-
sion by blacks to the force of this secessionist principle, then whites must
create armed enclaves for themselves and never venture outside except
under heavy guard and in daylight." This way of life is hardly an expres-
sion of the calm self-confidence that an autonomous individual expects to
enjoy, that the principle of secession means to claim. There is precious
little self-determination in these white redoubts; their residents are instead
hostage to the intentions (and even worse, to the fearfully imagined rapa-
cious intentions) of those excluded from access to the hoarded resources.
This is a starkly drawn picture of contemporary race relations. It is not
wholly accurate, though it corresponds to imagery regularly invoked in
popular media. It is not wholly accurate because, if it were, social repose
of any sort would have long ago vanished; if substantial numbers of
78. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 349-78 (1980); K. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 74-91 (2d ed. 1963); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1983).
79. Some have already taken such defensive actions:
[There is] a select but growing number of small and often remote cities whose citizens have
chosen to live behind walls.
In these cities, access to the gated areas is gained only by a variety of security measures..
"There's a real trend toward gating off in California," said Fred Christensen, a public
management consultant.
Golden Beach [Florida], population 612, is a small strip seven miles up the sand from
Miami Beach. Two years ago, access to the community was restricted by means of a central
guard station and gate on the main road ....
[The City Manager] said the reason for the move was an obvious one: "Security. We're not
that far from Miami."
Some Rich Towns Being Walled Off, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1983, at A12, col. 4.
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blacks-just thousands, say, among the millions living in comparative pov-
erty in urban areas-chose to define themselves as terrorists with no stake
in the preservation of existing entitlements, there is no practically effective
coercive force available to the targeted whites to guarantee repose. The
application of coercive force might protect the lives and property of most
whites. But this force could not exorcise the fears of these whites, their
nightmare sense of vulnerability that would haunt every waking and
sleeping hour. Nor, in this imagined community, would blacks' lives be
models of calm repose. They too would be increasingly subject to random
and ferocious retaliation because of the fear that they inspired. Fearful
whites, unable reliably to distinguish between "friendly" (that is, ade-
quately submissive) poor blacks and resentful black terrorists, would in-
creasingly define all poor blacks as fearsome terrorists. All poor (and
many rich) blacks in turn would increasingly define themselves in this
way because they could not escape, and there would be no advantage to
them in trying to escape, this white fear-imposed definition.
This is not contemporary American society, but it is a recognizable ver-
sion of it. This was Southern slave society-at least as revealed in the
occasional nightmare confessionals of the Founding Fathers who held
slaves and of some Southern gentry who presided over the institution of
slavery at later times.80 It is not a comfortable vision. It is a vision of
inevitable interdependence and of equality at least in one sense: of the
equal capacity of virtually any individual to make life a nightmare, a hell
on earth, for all others.
The Supreme Court's action in Brown implicitly evoked this vision; the
unanimous reaffirmation of Brown in the final paragraph of Cooper v.
Aaron vividly recalled this vision in the Justices' admission of their own
interdependence,"1 by choosing to yoke themselves together and thereby in
effect to depend on their shared strength or (which is the same thing) to
80. See, e.g., L. LrrwAcK, BEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY
59-63 (1979); THE IMPENDING CRISIS, supra note 12, at 451-55. Mary Chesnut described the cli-
mate of fear among whites in 1862 after Betsey Witherspoon, Mrs. Chesnut's cousin, was murdered
by her own slaves:
Hitherto I have never thought of being afraid of negroes. I had never injured any of them.
Why should they want to hurt me? . . . Somehow today I feel that the ground is cut away
from under my feet. Why should they treat me any better than they have done Cousin Betsey
Witherspoon?
[My sister] Kate and I sat up late and talked it all over ....
Kate's maid came in-a strong-built mulatto woman. She was dragging in a mattress. "Mis-
sis, I have brought my bed to sleep in your room while Mars David is [away] at Society Hill.
You ought not to stay in a room by yourself these times." And then she went off for more bed
gear.
"For the life of me," said Kate gravely, "I cannot make up my mind. Does she mean to take
care of me-or to murder me?"
MARY CHESNUT'S CIVIL WAR 199 (C. Woodward ed. 1981) (emphasis in original).
81. See supra p. 477.
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hold one another hostage. The Court of this era spoke to this sense of
interdependence in its general solicitude to visible outcasts-to criminal
defendants"' and prisoners,"3 to political dissenters," to illegitimate chil-
dren 5 and atheists, 8 to an array of outsiders who could be considered
"discrete and insular minorities' ' 87 especially deserving of judicial solici-
tude. The Court may have acted to include these quintessential outsiders
to safeguard the rest from the consequences of their disaffection. The
Court may have assumed that these outsiders could easily be incorporated
into the American "mainstream" because of the Justices' belief in its ca-
paciousness and resiliency, their confidence that no one need be excluded
in order to protect insiders from any threat."8 Whatever the Justices' mo-
tives, however-whatever the urgency of the threat they perceived from
unrepentant dissenters in our democracy-the possibility of disruption al-
ways exists.
The Supreme Court is not obliged to admit this openly. An open ad-
mission indeed might increase rather than allay anxiety; it might only
tempt dissenters by alerting them to their own disruptive strength or pro-
voke insiders to preemptive repression against dissenters by alerting them
to the fragility of their current comfort. These are questions of pedagogic
strategy, questions that no one can readily answer.8 9 But it is important to
82. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (persons taken into police custody must be
given statement of rights prior to interrogation).
83. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (state must provide transcripts of trial to indi-
gent criminal defendants planning appeal).
84. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957) (congressional committees may
not unjustifiably encroach on privacy of persons thought to be associated with Communist Party).
85. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating discriminatory wrongful death statute
which denied illegitimate children right of recovery).
86. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting state from requiring prayer in
public schools).
87. The phrase is from United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
88. Justice Frankfurter wrote this in an unpublished file memorandum during the Court's delib-
erations on Brown:
The outcome of the Civil War ... is that there is a single American society. Our colored
citizens . . . are not . . . to be denied the right to grow up with other Americans as part of
our national life. And experience happily shows that contacts tend to mitigate antagonisms and
engender mutual respect.
Quoted in R. KLUGER, supra note 30, at 684. A contemporary Presidential Commission agreed with
Frankfurter's assertion about the salutary effects of interracial contact:
[Recent] experiences demonstrate that segregation is an obstacle to establishing harmonious
relationships among groups. They prove that where the artificial barriers which divide people
and groups from one another are broken, tension and conflict begin to be replaced by coopera-
tive effort and an environment in which civil rights can thrive.
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 82-83 (1947); cf. R. HOF-
STADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 438 (1970) ("Somewhere around 1950. . .conflict as a
vitalizing idea began to be contested by the notion of a pervasive American consensus.").
89. The Court's attention to this issue of pedagogic strategy was apparent in one particular detail
of its opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). An early draft prepared by Justice Brennan set
out Marbury v. Madison as "establish[ing] the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution." Quoted in Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:
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acknowledge that principle- does not bar Supreme Court Justices from an-
swering one way or the other. In particular, democratic principle does not
require the Court to remain aloof from these questions, leaving them to
majoritarian institutions.
Thus, when Herbert Wechsler suggested that conflict between blacks
who wanted integration and whites who wanted segregation could not be
resolved in principle,90 he was correct. But Wechsler was wrong to draw
from this premise the conclusion that courts were therefore disabled from
addressing this conflict. The correct conclusion is that because the diamet-
ric, irreconcilable opposition between the parties mooted the application of
democratic principle, majoritarian institutions could not legitimately re-
solve this dispute. These institutions did purport to resolve it: Segregation
laws were duly enacted by majority vote. But these laws were illegitimate
because this diametrically opposed dispute could not be resolved by insti-
tutions organized on the basis of democratic principle. The Supreme
Court was justified on this ground in invalidating these laws.91
This justification for overturning legislation has apparently limitless
potential application. Every litigant who chooses to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a law in effect presents this justification on the face of his
complaint. Notwithstanding this common rhetorical posture, however,
every instance of constitutional litigation does not in fact reflect diametric
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 80 (1979). The draft opinion
then added that "[t]his decision was not without its critics, then and even now, but it has never been
deviated from in this Court. The country has long since accepted it as a sound, correct and permanent
interpretation." Id.
Even this minimal legitimation of, and apparent invitation for, criticism of the Court did not sur-
vive into the final version of this passage in the Court's opinion, which reads: "This decision declared
the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." 358 U.S. at 18.
The Court returned to this identical issue later that Term, but this time in a little-noticed case
addressing the jurisdiction of state courts over commercial transactions on Indian reservations. Justice
Black, writing for a unanimous Court, offered this historical exegesis on the relationship between
popular criticism and judicial authority:
Around 1830 the Georgia Legislature extended its laws to the Cherokee Reservation despite
federal treaties with the Indians which set aside this land for them. . . . The constitutionality
of these laws was tested in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515. . . . Rendering one of his most
courageous and eloquent opinions, Chief Justice Marshall held that Georgia's assertion of
power was invalid ....
Despite bitter criticism and the defiance of Georgia which refused to obey this Court's man-
date in Worcester the broad principles of that decision came to be accepted as law. Over the
years this Court has modified these principles . . . but the basic policy of Worcester has
remained.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1959) (footnotes omitted). According to Justice Black's clerk
that Term, Justice Frankfurter returned his draft copy of the opinion in this case with the notation,
"I agree with every word, including the essay on Brown v. Board of Education." Interview with
Guido Calabresi, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Univ. (Feb. 15, 1983) (notes on file with author).
90. Wechsler, supra note 32, at 34.
91. See pp. 461-66.
The Yale Law Journal
opposition of sufficient depth and intensity to raise doubts about the will-
ingness of one party to remain in a consensual communal relation with
the other, which would thus justify judicial intervention.
But even this formulation of a judgmental standard has extensive poten-
tial applicability in constitutional litigation. Deciding which dispute war-
rants judicial intervention by the standard suggested here should not rest
on a judge's personal preference for one disputant over others, but neither
can it rest on the application of clear-cut impersonal criteria that wholly
guard against this possibility. The decision for judicial intervention ulti-
mately must rest on an elusive criterion: the importance of the dispute,
either because of its general social signification or its intense urgency to
some few who are directly affected by it. Judges can give this criterion
sensible content only if they are passionately engaged in their contempo-
raries' concerns and, at the same time, impartial (or, perhaps more accu-
rately, encompassingly compassionate) toward all of the disputants who
bring the conflicting facets of those concerns into court.
The elusiveness of this formulation is reason enough for some to reject
it on the ground that the proper occasions for the exercise of judicial au-
thority must be clearly and rigorously limited in order to assure its un-
questioned legitimacy.92 But such rejection rests on a false premise if, as I
have argued, the proper purpose of judicial intervention is to signify that
the dispute at hand is so deeply divisive as to moot the applicability of
basic democratic principles. From this perspective, judicial authority can-
not depend on unquestionably legitimate authority. The very purpose of
judicial intervention in these circumstances is visibly to call into question
the legitimacy of all constituted authority, including the court's own au-
thority, with regard to the dispute at hand.9"
92. See, e.g., Bork, The hnpossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 695, 697-98; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
93. Michael Perry fails to grasp this proposition in his recent effort to formulate a rationale for
judicial activism. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). He
posits a "prophetic" function for courts "designed to enable the American polity to live out its commit-
ment to an ever-deepening moral understanding." Id. at 101. But because he assumes that democratic
theory demands primacy for electorally accountable institutions, Perry finds himself caught in a con-
tradiction between his conception of moral leadership for judges and the apparently superior authori-
tative claims of majoritarian institutions. Id. at 125-26. Perry resolves this contradiction by finding
that the Constitution gives clear-cut authority to Congress to silence federal courts, including the
Supreme Court (and probably even state courts) by withholding jurisdiction from them. Id. at 128-32.
In practical terms, Perry thereby trivializes his conception of a transcendent judicial role. In theoreti-
cal terms, Perry does not see that the legitimacy of this congressional power cannot be resolved by
reliance on democratic theory. In disputes of great historic moment, when Congress is most likely to
be sufficiently aroused to give serious consideration to this retaliatory withholding of court jurisdic-
tion, democratic theory cannot justify the victory of one political disputant over another or the primacy
of one institution (legislature or court) over the other. The historically persistent doctrinal stalemate
over the question of Congress' jurisdiction-withholding authority, id. at 132-33, is an apt reflection of
this stalemate in democratic principle.
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Intervention for this purpose does not permit a court to impose its own
resolution on the disputing parties. A court can only say-but this it must
say-that the dispute in its current posture cannot legitimately be resolved
and that accordingly the particular resolution, the legislative enactment,
that one party has imposed on the other is invalid. This is the proper limit
of judicial authority in invalidating legislation.94 This is, in final analysis,
all that Brown did. The Court overturned the extant race segregation laws
but did not dictate the scheme that would replace them; Brown II pur-
posefully held back from this imposition.95 The Court was not prepared to
demand immediate compliance or to define the precise terms of compli-
ance until 1968,96 and by then events of considerable significance had in-
tervened. In political terms, Southern defenders of the segregation regime
had been dramatically isolated and even shamed by the unprecedented
amassing of two-thirds of the Senate to override filibusters against the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965, and 1968. 97 (The 1968 Act was particu-
larly notable because its "fair housing" title applied more directly to
Northern patterns of race prejudice than to its Southern embodiments.9 )
Moreover, the Supreme Court itself had been extraordinarily transformed
between 1955 and 1968 by the changed status of Thurgood Marshall
from advocate for the scorned racial minority to member of the Court.99
None of these actions was commanded by the Court; none of them
could have been. Nor could the Court have forced Southern blacks to act
at risk to their very lives in demanding satisfaction-actions echoed by
President Johnson's promise that "we shall overcome" when he asked
Perry's basic error is in seeking to legitimize judical review by identifying principles for hierarchi-
cally ranking the relative authority of judicial and majoritarian institutions. He has distinguished
company in the commission of this error; it has been the dominant theme of constitutional law schol-
arship at least since James Bradley Thayer, id. at 17-18.
94. Conventional remedies doctrine expresses this limitation in the general rule that judges are
barred from correcting constitutional flaws they find in state or federal laws but must instead simply
invalidate the offending laws. See 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 416 (1972); Starr, Accommodation and Ac-
countability: A Slrategy. for Judicial Enforcement of Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REv.
399, 425-26 (1981). This doctrine is one aspect of a more general conception requiring that judges
not impose their own resolution on disputes underlying constitutional litigation but instead restrict
themselves to reopening the disputes invalidly resolved in majoritarian institutions. See Burt, The
Cozstilution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329, 357, 378-79.
95. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
96. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); see G. GUNTHER, supra note 67, at
765-69.
97. Thus when cloture was first voted in 1964, only seven Senators outside the South voted
against cloture: Goldwater and Hayden of Arizona, Young of North Dakota, Bible of Nevada,
Mechem of New Mexico, Byrd of West Virginia, and Simpson of Wyoming. 110 CONG. REc. 13,327
(1964).
98. S. LUBELL, WHITE AND BLACK: TEsT OF A NATION 140-45 (rev. ed. 1966); Hauser, Demo-
graphic Factors in the Integration of the Negro, 94 DAEDALUS 847, 850-53 (1965).
99. Justice Marshall was appointed to the Court in 1967; he had been appointed to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit by President Kennedy in 1962 and had resigned in 1965 to become
Solicitor General at President Johnson's appointment.
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Congress to enact the Voting Rights Act of 1965.100 The Court could and
did both command attention for these claims and identify the moral ideal
of community upon which these claims rested. But the Court could not
force the satisfaction of these claims-not only, and not even most signifi-
cantly, because it lacked the practical strength to mobilize this force. The
Court could not force this result because forced commitment to this moral
principle is self-contradictory; it is in itself a defeat for the principle.
This is also the lesson taught by the parables. They teach that commu-
nal membership cannot be commanded by any force, no matter how divine
or seemingly omnipotent. Forced love is a contradiction in terms, a reign
of terror. 1 But this is not the true force of the parables I have explored.
Forced attention to the truth of interdependent communal membership
and to the consequent urgent need for genuine communal fellowship-this
is the pedagogic method of these parables. Jesus invoked this method to
convey the substantive message of the need for divine salvation and to
overcome the easy impulse toward smug self-satisfaction, to refute the se-
cessionist error.
This error is not the secular lesson of the Declaration of Independence,
the supposed fount of the secessionist principle in our political tradition. I
cited the famous first sentence of the Declaration earlier, but only its in-
troductory phrase.1 02 The full sentence completes its message, the most
important part of which I omitted:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Na-
ture's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the
separation.'08
Here is the heart of the Declaration and of the role of the Supreme
Court in our society: the obligation to explain one's reasons, to acknowl-
edge in this way a continuing communal relationship even if the explana-
tion itself is offered as an attempt to justify refusing any closer or more
enduring ties. With this obligation to explain comes a reciprocal obliga-
tion to listen, and thus the possibility that at least a common language
100. See R. EvANs & R. NovAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF PowElt 496 (1966).
101. The Gospels' teachings have occasionally been distorted to this end. Thus, witness the holy
crusades and the infliction of terrible cruelty in Jesus' name; the New Testament suggests that Jesus
himself, though only momentarily, succumbed to this tendency. Luke 22:35-38.
102. See supra p. 458.
103. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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will emerge from this discord. Through discourse, the antagonists may
thus discover or uncover or rediscover their common humanity, ties that
truly bind them together notwithstanding their divisive conflicts.
Courts in our society should accordingly insist that, if conflict arises,
neither party quickly or automatically severs all relations. And even if one
party does conclude that the cost of a continuing relationship is so burden-
some that it must break all ties, nonetheless that party must explain this
reasoning and must at least listen to the other party's assertion that the
costs of secession are so great, that this party's need and desire for a con-
tinuing relationship are so powerful, that the seceder should reconsider
and affirm their enduring commonality. This process of explanation and
justification is not simply process for its own sake. It is process with a
substantive goal of teaching that anyone who withdraws from relations
with others must have a good reason for withdrawal that these others
should acknowledge and respect.
This pedagogic goal has two facets. The first is to provide occasions for
mutual recognition of previously unsuspected or denied empathic identifi-
cation with others' needs. Judicial process can press this identification into
realization by imposing a course of dialogic engagement, of intensive con-
versation and confrontation. This is the hope and promise of the peda-
gogic methodology of the parables.
The second facet is to vindicate the rule of law. In these fundamentally
divisive disputes, the rule of law is challenged because the disputes call
into question the existence of a shared and therefore mutually coherent
vocabulary of rights and duties. Yet without this common language, this
community of discourse, there is no way to talk meaningfully about mu-
tual obligations, even the obligation peacefully to respect one another's
wish to be left alone, to secede from communal relations.
Without this common language, therefore, one party's wish to with-
draw is merely the prelude to warfare (either open or covert but smolder-
ingly explosive) and there is no reason in principle that either party can
offer to avert this prospect. If, however, one pursues the claim to secede
not simply as a matter for brute imposition of force but instead as a claim
of right, the process of explanation and justification can transform this
claim into a mutual acknowledgement of communal obligations. This is
the one basic underlying communal bond that judges in our society can
legitimately command in order to vindicate the coherence of the rule of
law.
Dialogic engagement provides the means to create mutual meaning on
which the rule of law depends. Because this engagement is the precondi-
tion for developing the capacity for meaningful exchange, it is incoherent
in principle to constrain the dialogue by limiting a priori its substantive
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terms or the identity of the participants. Even the substantive premise of
equality, a bedrock democratic principle, is not a directive with specific
prior content.'O Equality is itself an idea with content that emerges and
changes over time through the process of dialogic exchange, a process that
courts can properly initiate and guide but not authoritatively conclude.
Thus the question, for example, whether fetuses or profoundly retarded
people or animals are equal participants in this social dialogue, with con-
sequent claims to full-fledged substantive entitlements, cannot coherently
depend on some a priori application of the notion of equality or of dia-
logue itself.105 Of course, social dialogue depends on interpersonal com-
munication. But if fetuses speak to me in ways that you cannot hear, that
does not mean that your deafness defines the permissible (or the actually
present) participants in the dialogue between us. I see three participants
and you see two: On what common principle do we count?"~ The answer
must be that we cannot count; we can only talk until an agreed calculus
emerges or we agree to disagree or one of us is prepared to accept the
consequences of walking away even without an agreement that the argu-
ment has ended.
And where does this dialogic process end? On what basis can one se-
cede from this conversation? There are perhaps practical answers to this
question: invoking superior coercive force to impose silence on an oppo-
nent, or enforcing physical distance by a unilateral move across some fron-
tier. But I see no end in principle, except a mutually agreed end. And
even the practical argument for the termination of dialogue, for secession,
in order to avoid irresolvable conflict is unconvincing for reasons that Lin-
coln set out in his inaugural appeal to the South on the eve of the Civil
War:
Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can
treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can
among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and
when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease
fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are
again upon yoU 107
Lincoln's words did not persuade. And the force he then invoked to
preserve a communal bond led to no mutually agreed end but only to
104. See Karst, Why Equaliy Matters, 17 GA. L. Rav. 245 (1983) (ideal of equality has had
different meanings in different eras).
105. See B. ACmERMAN, supra note 78, at 69-103.
106. The Supreme Court wrongly held itself to be the authoritative calculator in this dispute in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Burt, supra note 94, at 371-73 (criticizing Roe).
107. Lincoln's First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in 1 DocuMEwrs or AMEX!-
CAN HISTORY 388 (H. Commager ed., 4th ed. 1948).
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unilaterally imposed surrender. That the South fought to preserve its own
regime of involuntary servitude testifies to the paradoxical, tragic difficul-
ties that recurrently obstruct the capacity of people to find a common lan-
guage of mutual respect and obligation. But the Civil War also teaches
that unless we honor this basic bond of persistent mutual engagement and
obligatory dialogue as the means for this engagement, then each of us is
truly alone and defenseless.
V.
The Supreme Court, in its current applications of the state autonomy
principle, has not embraced this lesson. The Court's vision of states' rights
and of the claim for individual autonomy from relations with others in its
recent cases involving retardation and racial segregation treats the simple
assertion of the wish to avoid association as intrinsically justified without
any need to account for, or listen to, competing claims.10 8 Conflict between
many disputing parties may in fact be so deep that an encompassing sense
of community might never emerge, so that hostile separation is inevitable.
But the current Court majority assumes this result too quickly. Its vision
of autonomy does not give a fair opportunity to those who might persuade,
who might touch the hearts of those who would otherwise abandon future
relations with them.
In their hasty assumption, the Justices not only shut off the possibility
that the disputants will learn about their deeper, previously unsuspected
commonalities. The Justices also shut off the possibility that they will
themselves learn this. These Justices thereby misconstrue the great pur-
pose of the litigative process itself in our society: its embodiment of an
ultimate ideal of a common humanity in the operating rule that litigation
is open to anyone who feels aggrieved, that judges must listen and
respond.
This misconstruction was the first great evil, the initial profanation, of
the Dred Scott decision in the Supreme Court's ruling that black slaves
could not be heard in federal courts because they were not citizens of the
United States.109 This issue is also at the heart of the recent Supreme
108. The effort to enshrine this autonomy principle in constitutional doctrine is not limited to
these cases; it has been a favorite project for Justice Rehnquist. See Powell, The CompleatJefferso-
nian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317 (1982). Justice O'Connor has more
recently joined this enterprise. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is not yet clear, however, that a solid majority of the
present Court has coalesced to accept or to reject this effort. Compare National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overturning congressional imposition of minimum wage for state em-
ployees) with EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983) (affirming congressional proscription of
mandatory age-based retirement for state employees).
109. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426-27 (1856).
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Court cases regarding retarded people. The basic question is not whether
ordinary schools and residential neighborhoods must welcome retarded
people or whether extraordinary tax resources must be allocated to them.
The deeper question is whether there is any continuing obligation on so-
called "normal" people to listen and respond to the claims of retarded
people, and thereby to acknowledge at least this much shared humanity.
The cases involving retardation do not clearly present the same threat
to social order that leap from the disputes between blacks and whites. The
race disputes implicitly teach the lesson that secession-minded whites can-
not simply walk away from blacks by a unilateral act of will, that whites
cannot vindicate the secessionist principle unless blacks acquiesce by
agreeing to let the whites live in peace. But does a similar lesson govern
relations between normal and retarded people? The ostentatious depen-
dency of institutionalized retarded people, their seemingly patent incapac-
ity to care for themselves, suggests both that normal people can unilater-
ally sever relations and that social relations with retarded people rest on
nothing but an unreciprocated act of grace. If neither the normal donor
nor the retarded donee conceives of himself as participating in a recipro-
cating relationship, is there really an underlying communal relation be-
tween them? Even more significantly, can people utterly incapable of so-
cial exchange, such as those who are profoundly retarded, be part of a
communal relation if, as I have suggested, dialogic engagement is the es-
sential precondition for community?
Despite these apparent barriers, however, there are at least two ways
that a communal relation can exist with even the most profoundly re-
tarded person. Both ways paradoxically take root in the mind of only one
participant in the exchange. The first, and perhaps more easily grasped,
depends on hope-the optimistically imagined prospect that some future
relation on some terms is possible, even with the most profoundly retarded
person. In some circumstances, of course, this hope may seem wholly im-
probable to most observers. But this improbability does not diminish and
may even intensify the hope of some people. This is a common attitude of
many parents of retarded children and is reflected in their intense, pro-
longed efforts to elicit even the most minimal social responses from their
children.110 This attitude most likely reflects an intensely felt identifica-
tion of parent with child based on the fact of biological linkage, a tie that
the parent does not view as severable by any unilateral act of will. When
these parents demand that others view their children as they do, as dis-
abled but potentially less so and, in any event, as fundamentally equal
110. See H. FEATHERSTONE, A DIFFERENCE IN THE FAMILY (1980); J. GREENFELD, A CHILD
CALLED NOAH (1972); J. GREENFELD, A PLACE FOR NomH (1978); J. MURRAY & E. MURRAY,
AND SAY WHAT HE Is: THE LIFE OF A SPECIAL CHILD (1975); C. PARK, THE SIEGE (1967).
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participants in the human community, others can refuse this demand only
by disparaging the deepest convictions of these parents and thereby deny-
ing the essential terms of a communal relationship with these parents.
This formulation depends on empathy-on parents' feeling for their
child and others' regard for those parents. There is another way to con-
sider relations with a profoundly retarded person that does not, however,
so crucially depend on this benign, altruistic view. Hope is not the only
wellspring from which mentally normal people can draw a conception of
social relations with profoundly retarded people. Fear is another. This
fear can grip parents and others as deeply as hope, and it can also distort
rational capacities by creating a fantastic image of retarded people, even of
the most remote and helplessly retarded person. This fear and the imagery
it spawns may be irrational but they are nonetheless passionately real for
those gripped by them. Thus consider these words written by Mr. Justice
Holmes, upholding compulsory sterilization of mentally retarded people:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call
upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser
sacrifices. . . in order to prevent our being swamped with incompe-
tence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecil-
ity, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continu-
ing their kind . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.'11
It is clear today that these fears were wildly exaggerated, as were be-
liefs in the biological heritability of retardation and its amenability to re-
productive control." 12 But the sense of vast threat from retarded people
and the consequent embattled stance of Holmes and his contemporaries
were real enough for them. If the threat of "degenerate . . . crime," of
"being swamped with incompetence," did not come from retarded people,
it must have come from the imaginations of those who viewed them. Per-
haps Holmes and his contemporaries painted their darkest fears about
themselves and their vulnerability in the world as they saw it onto the
temptingly empty faces (as they saw them) of retarded people. From this
perspective, it was not retarded people who were feared; they were not
seen except for what they were fearfully imagined to represent.
This same projective process may be at work today, even in the more
111. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citation omitted).
112. See S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 146-74, 335-36 (1981); K. LUDMERER, GENET-
ICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL 87-113 (1972) (noting links between eu-
genic sterilization laws and passage of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924, ostensibly to protect
American society from "race suicide" by influx of "biologically inferior" racial stock).
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benign contemporary attitude toward retarded people. Consider this in-
dictment of institutional residence by the District Judge, Raymond Brod-
erick, in the Pennhurst case:
At its best, Pennhurst is typical of large residential state institu-
tions for the retarded. These institutions are the most isolated and
restrictive settings in which to treat the retarded. Pennhurst is almost
totally impersonal. Its residents have no privacy-they sleep in large,
overcrowded wards, spend their waking hours together in large day
rooms and eat in a large group setting. They must conform to the
schedule of the institution which allows for no individual flexibility
The environment at Pennhurst is not conducive to normalization.
It does not reflect society. It is separate and isolated from society and
represents group rather than family living.118
Judge Broderick is undoubtedly correct in his portrayal of the harm
this institution works on its residents. But I hear an added force behind
these words, an attitude toward and fear of institutions that is not re-
stricted to their impact on retarded people. I hear this force in one aspect
of the judge's indictment that is surely wrong: his conclusion that
Pennhurst "does not reflect society." It does reflect society-the frighten-
ing aspects, that is, of contemporary American society in its impersonality,
its threats to individual privacy, its demands for conformity "which allow
for no individual flexibility." Retarded residents of Pennhurst are more
patently afflicted by these institutional characteristics, more obviously dis-
abled from developing their capacities for self-sufficiency than ordinary
people. But Pennhurst is nonetheless a nightmare reflection of the power-
ful social constraints on anyone's capacity to achieve self-sufficient
autonomy.
An echo of this same nightmare accompanies the newly adamant claims
of handicapped people generally in public forums. Their claims are for
rights to independence, to self-respect, and to self-sufficiency. But these
claimed rights contain the implicit acknowledgement that handicapped
people cannot vindicate their claims without others' assistance. This
needed assistance may involve others' financial resources (as in tax sup-
port for special educational resources or for wheelchair ramps into public
facilities 1 4); it may involve others' emotional resources (as in families' de-
votion or neighbors' tolerance for the appearance of handicapped people
113. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1303, 1311 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (citations omitted), aff'd in part and revd' in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981).
114. See 20 US.C. §§ 1401-20 (1976) (free public education for all handicapped children); 42
U.S.C. §§ 4151-57 (1976) (public facilities access).
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as residents in their community). It is thus paradoxical that handicapped
people must depend on others' assistance in order to achieve their goal of
independence from others. But in this paradoxical dependence, handi-
capped people resemble everyone who, in striving for independent auton-
omy, is nonetheless constrained by an inescapable economic and social net-
work of interrelated dependencies-everyone, that is, in America today.
To see fears that afflict most people, "normal" people, in the injuries
claimed by handicapped people does not disprove the reality of those inju-
ries. To see a pervasive fear of institutional depersonalization in contem-
porary American society as adding intensity to Judge Broderick's wish to
close down Pennhurst does not show the error of this course. I draw these
linkages for a more limited purpose, to suggest that this kind of projective
identification itself significantly shapes the conception of a social relation-
ship. The claims of physically handicapped people may owe their recent
visibility and salience to widespread (and newly intense) fears among
able-bodied people about personal independence and vulnerability, fears
that may have provided the first words in a newly evolving mutual vocab-
ulary between able-bodied and handicapped people. But active dialogue is
not the only way that this language can take shape. A conception of a
relationship can occur in the mind of only one participant. A relationship
can thus arise even with the most profoundly, the most remote and un-
communicative retarded person. Indeed, the very remoteness of this person
can feed the image of a relationship that arises from a belief and fear that
interpersonal isolation is a characteristic affliction of our time.""5
Assuming that this speculation is correct, it might appear that a com-
munal relationship between the "normal" majority and the handicapped
minority would find its own adequate expression in majoritarian legisla-
tive institutions without the need for a special judicial role. But this does
not follow. The fear that produces the conception of the relationship can
have an added paradoxical quality that leads those in its grip to deny its
force in their own minds, to wish that they could banish this fear and its
imagined embodiment in this alien "other" by a unilateral act of will. For
retarded people, the social history of the origins and expansive use of iso-
lated institutions testifies to the power of this wish. 1" This impulse to
isolate and abuse the embodied expression of one's own fears can take
many forms. Whatever the form, this impulse is a kind of internal war-
115. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT
RELATIONS 144-73 (1979) (discussing psychological forces that ascribe fearful communication to
seemingly silent people, such as comatose or profoundly retarded).
116. See Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, in CHANGING
PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 88-129 (R. Kugel & W.
Wolfensberger eds. 1969).
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fare, a struggle denoted, for example, by Justice Holmes's embattled
words.
A legislative vote or a public opinion poll might readily demonstrate
whether many Americans perceive a fundamental similarity between
handicapped and "normal" people. But no poll could reliably probe the
question whether some or many or most people darkly glimpse this simi-
larity but recoil from acknowledging it as a fearful possibility. Fateful
consequences would follow for any group or individual caught in this con-
ceptual bind. They would avoid contact or any acknowledgement of a po-
tentially reciprocal relationship with handicapped people, and yet, at the
same time, this stance would seem precarious since they were not only
avoiding handicapped people but running from that part of themselves
which suggested a common identity with handicapped people. This effort
to sever relations with the handicapped is thus an exhausting-literally
self-defeating-pursuit. These people are not so much at war with handi-
capped people (though they can readily be tempted to wage quite brutal
warfare against them, in large residential institutions and elsewhere).
These people are more fundamentally at war with themselves, with their
divided selves. This inner division, this ambivalence, could lead these peo-
ple vociferously to deny any common bond with handicapped people at
the same time that they unconsciously believed in, but recoiled from ac-
knowledging, that bond.117 Actions of majoritarian institutions based on
these attitudes toward handicapped people lack an adequate consensual
base, but not because handicapped people themselves might oppose these
policies. This consensual basis is lacking because the "normal" majority is
divided within itself. The diametric opposition that robs public policy of
legitimacy can thus be found in the minds of one party to an imagined
relationship, in the ambivalence and fear of the majority who voted for
that policy.
It is, of course, not clear whether or to what extent this fear dominates
contemporary public policy toward handicapped people. But its plausibil-
ity is, I believe, sufficient to justify a court's acting to test the hypothesis,
to prove or disprove it. This proof cannot come through judicial factfind-
ing in its conventionally conceived sense. This proof can only come
through a prolonged process in which judges lead others (litigants and
those who witness litigation) to confront and answer for themselves the
question whether they truly see themselves as free to deny any communal
bond with handicapped people.11 8 This confrontational process, this insis-
117. See generally R. BuRT, supra note 115, at 61-71, 169-72 (discussing psychological dynam-
ics of ambivalence toward apparently powerless people).
118. For consideration of the ways this role conception should guide judges generally in litigation
challenging the treatment of retarded people by large-scale bureaucracies, such as residential institu-
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tence on a prolonged dialogue, is the methodology that I have identified as
characteristic of the parables and the race cases. This methodology is not
irrelevant because one party appears disabled from active participa-
tion-because, for example, one is profoundly retarded. In this context,
the necessary dialogic engagement takes place in one divided mind.
This, then, is the pedagogic role that I see for courts regarding the
status of the handicapped people in our society-to honor hope (of these
people or their parents or others) for their inclusion in a fully communal
relationship and to confront fear that may shut them away from such an
acknowledged relationship. This role should guide courts in specific cases.
In its recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has lost sight of this
role.
In Youngberg v. Romeo,119 damages were claimed against state officials
for a profoundly retarded Pennhurst resident because staff and other resi-
dents had repeatedly injured him, tied him in restraints for prolonged
times, and failed to provide him with a training program. The district
court ruled that the failure to provide this training program did not pre-
sent a claim of constitutional right;120 the Supreme Court reversed this
ruling, holding that Pennhurst must provide at least the "minimally ade-
quate or reasonable training" likely to promote Romeo's capacity for self-
control.121 In effect, the Court required communal efforts to enhance the
possibility of some minimal social relation with this most profoundly re-
tarded person, even if this communal effort was nothing more than trying
to teach Nicholas Romeo to control his aggressive impulses so that he
would not frighten others and provoke them to abuse him or cage him like
a wild animal.1 22 This is a limited conception of a social relationship, but
it is nonetheless fundamentally different in principle and in practice from
the unadorned custodial purposes of Pennhurst and other traditional state
retardation institutions.
The lesson of community is thus clearly at work in the Court's decision
in Youngberg v. Romeo. The Court had misunderstood this lesson, how-
ever, in its decision the preceding Term in Pennhurst v. Halderman1 23
The constitutional rights of retarded people were not directly at issue in
tions or public schools, see Burt, Pennhurst: A Parable, in IN THE INTERESTS OF CHILDREN: ADVO-
CACY, LAw REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY (R. Mnookin ed.) (forthcoming).
119. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
120. See Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting district court's
standard of "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the resident").
121. 457 U.S. at 319.
122. The Supreme Court pointedly left open the question whether the Constitution requires state
institutions to engage in more intensive training efforts to promote the self-sufficiency of their resi-
dents; the Court found that Romeo's complaint had not sought this more intensive treatment program.
Id. at 317-18.
123. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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Pennhurst; the question was whether Congress had recognized the rights
of institutionalized retarded people to intensive treatment programs gener-
ally and to community residential placement specifically. The Court ruled
that, though Congress had spoken of such rights in a 1975 act, this invo-
cation was only "hortatory, not mandatory" on the states.' 2 '
Dissenting Justices strenuously argued that this misread the true intent
of the statute.' " I would argue a somewhat different proposition-that
even if the 1975 Act were ambiguous on this score, the Court should have
construed this ambiguity in favor of imposing obligations for treatment
and community placement on the states. The Court's fundamental misun-
derstanding of its proper role in these disputes was not so much in its
reading of this statute as in the enunciated canon of statutory construction
that led to this reading. Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress must
speak "unambiguously" before the Court would construe the Act as im-
posing any obligation upon the states regarding services for retarded peo-
ple. He asserted that this was a traditional matter of state sovereignty and
that therefore congressional impositions were at least constitutionally sus-
pect if not prohibited altogether.12 6 Justice Rehnquist invoked this same
interpretive canon in the service of a similarly parsimonious reading of
congressional intent the succeeding Term in Board of Education v. Row-
ley,127 holding that the mandate in another congressional act for "free ap-
propriate public education" for all handicapped children did not require a
full-time sign language interpreter for a deaf child."'
Whichever way the Court chose to construe the statute at issue in these
cases-whether for or against a more inclusive communal relation-the
Congress could enact a new law unambiguously expressing a contrary in-
tent. 2' The practical force of legislative inertia, however, always gives
124. Id. at 24.
125. Id. at 34-41 (White, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (Congress in-
tended Developmentally Disabled and Bill of Rights Act to serve as requirement that participating
states must observe to receive federal funds).
126. Id. at 17.
127. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
128. Id. at 209-10. The school board had refused to provide an interpreter for several reasons: It
would be extraordinarily expensive ($20,000 to $25,000 each year, according to its estimates), the
board was already providing some compensatory services, and the child was learning well enough
(though she nonetheless missed hearing about half of what transpired in the classroom). N.Y. Times,
Mar. 24, 1982, at Bi, col. 1, B4, col. 5. The child was represented in the Supreme Court by an
attorney who was himself deaf; the Court broke precedent by permitting a stenographer to type out
the Justices' questions and opposing counsels' argument so that the attorney could respond to them.
Id.
129. Indeed, the 1975 Act at issue in Pennhurst expired by its own terms on July 1, 1981, less
than four months after the Supreme Court's ruling. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 3007 (1978).
Thus, any judicial construction of the Act in that case would necessarily have received virtually imme-
diate congressional consideration, whether for ratification or rejection by action or inaction.
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some staying power to the current law. 30 In construing ambiguous statu-
tory language, the Court can properly pursue its pedagogic purposes by
allocating this advantage. If, as I have argued, the Court should favor the
communal principle, then Justice Rehnquist's interpretive canon is wrong.
This canon's general deference to state autonomy and its specific applica-
tion in Pennhurst and Rowley against the claims of handicapped people
favor the secessionist error.
The Justices committed this error in another way in Pennhurst. The
Court of Appeals found that in enacting the Bill of Rights provisions of
the 1975 Act, Congress had intended to invoke its authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.131 The appellate court concluded that judges
should therefore defer to this congressional finding that the Constitution
guaranteed to retarded people "a right to appropriate treatment" gener-
ally, and specifically the provision of that treatment "in the setting that is
least restrictive of [their] personal liberty," that is, in ordinary community
settings. 132 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that Congress had not
exercised this authority because it had not unambiguously expressed such
intention in the text of the statute itself.133 This, too, was a mistake. Even
accepting the premise that congressional intent was unclear here, the
Court should have welcomed and reached out to find Congress's constitu-
tional interpretive authority in this matter.
When Congress deliberated the 1975 Act, several federal district courts
had already conducted extensive hearings on conditions in state retarda-
tion institutions and had found brutal degradations. These courts had
ruled that constitutional rights were thereby violated but they differed in
prescribing remedies, some restricting attention to institution-based im-
provements and others pressing for greater use of community facilities.14
The 1975 Act plausibly-I would say most plausibly-reflected a general
congressional endorsement of these judicial findings that institutional con-
ditions violated constitutional rights, a directive that increased use of com-
munity facilities has some important role in correcting these violations,
and a commitment of federal funds and executive enforcement power to
this corrective purpose.135 The Act thus appears to offer a collaboration
130. See G. CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6, 101-03 (1982).
131. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981).
132. Id. at 106 (quoting H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 473, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1975)).
133. 451 U.S. at 15-17.
134. Compare Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala..1972) (Constitution requires
minimum levels of care and training at state institution for mentally retarded people), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) with New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (approving consent judgment which included goal of
developing community facilities and substantially reducing population of state retardation institution).
135. The relevant portion of the Act is § 6010:
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between Congress and the courts in addressing problems of inhumane
conditions in state retardation institutions. The Supreme Court's Penn-
hurst decision in effect spurned this offer.
The Court's more recent opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo acknowledged
the brutality of these institutions and held that constitutional rights were
thus violated. But the Court invoked only its own authority in this hold-
ing. The Court did not only miss the opportunity the previous Term, in
Pennhurst, to buttress judicial authority in these matters. More funda-
mentally, the Court failed to understand or admit that its isolated author-
ity was insufficient to remedy any of these institutional problems; the
Court failed to see that unless it could enlist the active assistance of many
others, it could not effectively protect Nicholas Romeo and those like him.
This judicial incapacity comes from more than the inherent enforce-
ment weaknesses of courts in our constitutional scheme. It comes more
pointedly from the special features of litigation aimed at abuses of large-
scale bureaucratic institutions. A judge may find abuses and want to cor-
rect them. But who in a diffuse bureaucracy is responsible for the wrong-
doing? Who has clear internal authority and sufficient command of re-
sources to undo the wrongs? Who is available and sufficiently attentive to
police the bureaucracy's future compliance in its dealings with those ines-
capably caught within it? Unless the judge can enlist the assistance of
many others, including, ultimately, at least the grudging acquiescence of a
significant number of officials and employees within the challenged bu-
reaucracy itself, the judge will talk to the wind in his injunctions.1 3 6 Con-
gress has greater power over state institutions; it has direct command of
federal funds and executive enforcement personnel, and it has the moral
and political force of its popular mandate. The Supreme Court could ben-
efit greatly from the assistance of this congressional power to enforce even
its limited directive to state institutions in Romeo; it had the offer in hand
in Pennhurst.
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with developmental
disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities
should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and should be pro-
vided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure that public
funds are not provided* to any institution[] . . . that-
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs
of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards . . ..
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
136. See Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public
Institutions, 65 VA. L. Rav. 43, 99-103 (1979); Starr, supra note 94, at 438-39.
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The Court's enforcement problems are not unique to residential institu-
tions for retarded people. These problems are endemic to its attempts to
influence any of the large-scale bureaucracies that dominate contemporary
social life. The Court most dramatically encountered these problems in its
efforts to alter racial segregation practices in the South. Even before the
Court grappled directly with public school segregation, it had repeatedly
addressed racial discrimination in law enforcement13" 7 and in voting prac-
tices138 and had found itself lacking effective power. The Court's experi-
ence after Brown reinforced this lesson.'39 When Congress lent its force to
the Court's commands-tentatively in the 1957 Civil Rights Act and then
resoundingly in the 1964 and 1965 Acts-Southern compliance increased
exponentially.140 The Court drew on this experience in 1966 when it de-
cided that Congress had independent authority to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this decision, Katzenbach v. Morgan,"' the Court meant
to welcome and encourage the active collaboration of Congress in accom-
plishing the communitarian goals of Brown."2 The Court's recent crabbed
application of the Morgan doctrine in the service of "state autonomy" sig-
nifies a considerable falling in its vision.
The Court's failure to acknowledge its own institutional dependence in
Pennhurst and Romeo extends beyond these particular cases. The Court's
isolated vision of its own institutional role and authority is one aspect of
its pervasive blindness to the fact and to the implications of interdepen-
dence in all social relations. Its conception of states as autonomous actors
in our federal system, rather than as necessarily interdependent with the
national government, is another aspect. The Court's attitude toward race
137. See, e.g., Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1939) (systematic exclusion of blacks from jury
lists violates equal protection clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (court must appoint
counsel for felony defendant, in part to allow challenges to discriminatory jury selections).
138. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating statute excluding blacks from
voting in Texas primary elections); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (same); Smith v. Allwright,
326 U.S. 649 (1944) (same).
139. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 636 n.133 (1983) (discussing
resistance of school boards to integration).
140. In the 1960-61 school year, only 6.4% of black students in the seventeen states classified as
Southern attended school with any white students; this figure had increased to 39.6% by the 1968-69
school year and to 84.3% by the 1970-71 school year. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 124 (1974). Compare this observation by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit: "The only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is one
that works. . . . A national effort, bringing together Congress, the executive, and the judiciary may
be able to make meaningful the right of Negro children to equal educational opportunities. The courts
acting alone have failed." United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 847 (5th
Cir. 1966) (emphasis in original).
141. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
142. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 784 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 343 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Burt, Mi-
randa and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. Rav. 81, 110-11, 113 n.120, 118.
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relations, its willingness to ratify rather than to resist contemporary sepa-
ratist impulses, is yet another. In all of these matters, the Court should
instead offer a vision that might lead others to see themselves clearly as
members of a single, interdependent, and mutually supportive community.
The pedagogic strategy that the Court should follow in holding out this
vision cannot be reduced to any simple formula. Both the proper occasions
for initial judicial intervention in any particular dispute and the persis-
tence of courts in reopening repeated majoritarian resolutions of these dis-
putes will depend on many complicated considerations. The underlying
goal in all cases is for the Court to ensure that anyone's claim for inclu-
sion in a communal relation receive sustained, serious attention from all
others.
VI.
There is considerable room for difference of opinion in discerning the
proper occasions for judicial intervention. It can be argued in race rela-
tions, for example, that contemporary patterns of intertwined racial and
economic barriers reflect the conclusion of a long, hard-fought social delib-
erative process provoked by the Court a generation ago. I would argue,
however, that though these relations now seem settled, and though they
differ significantly from the communal race relations that prevailed before
Brown, the fearful social consequences of current patterns are not truly
understood or widely acknowledged. I therefore see an important contem-
porary judicial role toward this end.
But even if judicial intervention in racial matters has run its proper
course for now, the courts have not focused equivalent, sustained attention
on the claims and status of handicapped people in our society. Lower fed-
eral courts made an important beginning during the past decade, and
Congress spoke significantly in the two 1975 Acts. But the Supreme Court
has thus far misunderstood these voices and its own proper role in this
question. Of course social resources are scarce; of course the claims of
handicapped people conflict with the claims of others to keep their scarce
resources for themselves; of course there is considerable prospect that these
conflicting claims will end in irreconcilable and openly hostile conflict.
Courts should nonetheless hold out the possibility for sustained serious
deliberation that these claims are not truly in conflict, that as the father in
the parable suggested to his elder son, the return of these lost brothers will
be an occasion for rejoicing because everyone will have regained a lost
part of himself.
Courts in our constitutional scheme can play a significant role in giving
life to this aspiration, in repeatedly resurrecting it from apparent defeats
inflicted in majoritarian institutions. Ultimately this is the great gift that
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the institution of judicial review offers our society-the opportunity for a
majority to undo an action the consequences of which appear, as Chief
Justice Stone put it, on "sober second thought"14 to harm the majority
and the minority, the perpetrator and the victim. The majority will make
good use of this gift only if, when forced to this "sober second thought," it
finds more in common with the previously defeated minority than it had
been prepared to acknowledge. If the majority finds this, it will then seek
to affirm this common ground rather than to reiterate its previous subor-
dination of the minority. Judges cannot force this result; but by identify-
ing the values impeached by the majority's prior action and by forcing the
majority to reconsider its action in the light of those values, judges can
lead the majority toward embracing this result.
This was the ultimate pedagogic goal of the father toward his elder son
in the prodigal son parable. The father invoked his authority only to de-
mand that this son consider the possibility that he had more reason to
welcome than to regret his brother's return. He left it for the elder son to
discover the truth of this conclusion for himself. But though the father did
not spell out the reasons, the elder son could find them if he accepted the
premise that he and his brother shared a common interest-that both
were barred from finding a haven unless each was willing to embrace the
other. And once he had seen this identity of interest with his brother, the
elder son might also see his own true identity.
The father did not openly assert the true identity of his elder son nor
does the parable explicitly reveal this for the listener or the reader, but
there are many hints in the parable that the elder son was in fact Cain,
who had once murdered his younger brother Abel. In the Old Testament,
Cain was impelled to murder after God had favored Abel's offerings of
the "fat portions" of slaughtered lambs and had rejected Cain's offerings
of produce. Then "Cain was very angry, and . .. said to Abel his
brother, 'Let us go out to the field.' And when they were in the field, Cain
rose up against his brother Abel, and killed him." God then condemned
Cain to "be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth." '44 In the prodigal
son parable, the elder son was "in the field" when he first appeared in the
narrative and when he later complained of his father's favoritism in kill-
ing the "fatted calf" to welcome his brother. The New Testament parable
thus suggests that the younger son Abel has been brought back to life-he
"was dead, and is alive; he was lost and is found"145-so that the elder
son Cain is given the chance to end his own fugitive status and return
home. But he can grasp this opportunity to repent, this chance for a
143. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936).
144. Genesis 4:4-12 (Revised Standard).
145. Luke 15:32 (Revised Standard).
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"sober second thought," only if he understands and acknowledges both his
true identity and the wrongfulness of his past inflictions on his brother. 1"
The father did not force this lesson on the elder son in the New Testa-
ment parable. It is hidden, embedded in the narrative of the parable. The
elder son could find this lesson only if he exerted effort to search for it.
But if he discovered it, and saw how directly it applied to him, then he
would have clear reason to rejoice at his younger brother's return, for this
would now mark the end of his own wandering and permit his own safe
return home.
The parable thus gives the same opportunity for repentence, for "sober
second thought" regarding the fraternal infliction of harm, to which Chief
Justice Stone referred in his characterization of the function of judicial
review. Like the father in the parable, judges cannot force anyone to take
advantage of these opportunities. But like the father, judges can and must
show how these opportunities for communal reconciliation might be
grasped. When judges understand this lesson, then they can force others to
attend to its truth in the same way that Jesus commanded attention when
he told his first parable: "Listen! ... If you have ears to hear, then
hear., 147
146. This reiteration of the Genesis account of the first murder in the prodigal son parable is
characteristic of the relationship between much of the Old and New Testaments. See N. FRYE, THE
GREAT CODE: THE BIBLE AND LiTERTURE 78-79 (1982).
147. Mark 4:3-9 (New English).
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